IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF BELIZE A.D., 2001
Action
No. 155 of 2001
Between |
(NEDAL
J. MCLAREN |
PLAINTIFF |
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(
(
( And
(
( |
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|
(OMARIO
PERDOMO
(as commissioner of the
(Belize Football League |
DEFENDANT |
Applicant
In Person
Mr. C. Coye for Respondent
J
U D G M E N T
AWICH J:
Notes: |
Interlocutory
injunction - consideration for granting, serious triable
issue (question), vexatious substantive case, balance
of convenience, whether monetary award would be adequate
compensation, use by another of a registered trade name
under the Business Names Act, Cap. 204. |
An Application
This is judgment in the summons application filed at court
on 23.3.2001, of Mr. Nedal J. McLaren, for an interlocutory
(temporary) injunction order stopping Mr. Omario Perdomo,
the respondent, from using the name, Belize Football League,
which McLaren says is his registered trade name. McLaren
asks that the interlocutory injunction order be granted
and to last until the substantiative case, No. 155 of 2001,
between him and Perdomo is decided.
The
Substantive Case
The
substantive case was filed on the same date, 23.3.2001,
as the interlocutory application. In the particulars of
the case, McLaren averred that on 4.1.2001, he applied for
and had the name, Belize Football League, registered as
his business name, under the Business Names Act, Chapter
204, in the Laws of Belize. On 26.1.2001, he states,
he wrote to Perdomo demanding that Perdomo stop using the
name, Belize Football League, but Perdomo continues to use
the name to date. McLaren sought as final relief, court
declaration that he, McLaren is the, "exclusive owner
of the business name, 'Belize Football League'," and
damages (compensation) for loss caused to McLaren by Perdomo
by using the name.
I have
not seen a memorandum of appearance nor a defence of Perdomo,
but from his affidavit filed on 29.3.2001, in reply to the
interlocutory application, it is obvious that he strongly
contests the case. In the affidavit, Perdomo deposed that
he had used the name, Belize Football League, since 1995,
well before McLaren had the name registered. He outlined
in detail the activities of competitive football that he
and associated football clubs in Belize have been and continue
to organize under the name, Belize Football League. He described
as malicious, McLaren's action in having the name registered.
Application
Opposed
Perdomo would like McLaren's substantive case and the application
dismissed on the grounds that the substantive case is baseless
and because the case is vexatious and an abuse of process.
A request to have the case dismissed would have to be made
by a separate application and by giving due notice to McLaren.
I shall, however, take the argument of learned counsel Mr.
C. Coye for Perdomo, as an argument to support a submission
that McLaren's case is not serious enough to found an application
for interlocutory injunction order.
Perdomo
based his ground that McLaren's case is vexatious and an
abuse of process on the fact that he Perdomo had filed an
earlier case, No. 76 of 2001, at the Supreme Court, the
relief he sought in the case was an injunction to stop McLaren
using the name Belize Football League, the facts and issues
in McLaren's case No. 155 of 2001, Perdomo says, are the
same in his case No. 76 of 2001..
The
Law about Interlocutory Injunction
The
purpose of granting an interlocutory injunction is to avoid
or minimise loss to an applicant plaintiff while the substantive
case proceeds to the final determination. The loss is avoided
or minimised by ordering the defendant to stop the controversial
activity so that the status quo, the state
of affairs, are preserved while the substantive case proceeds
to finality.
The
law in Belize about granting or refusing to grant interlocutory
injunction order is based on the English Common Law applied
in Belize by Section 2 of the Imperial Laws (Extension)
Act, Cap. 2, in the Statute Laws of Belize. The
Common Law as applied in Belize has been stated in, among
other
cases, Paul v M.F.G. Enterprises Ltd, Action No. 284
of 1996. In the case, H.S.R. Moe J. stated:
"There is common ground among both parties that the
basic principles for granting interlocutory injunction inter
partes are those set out in Hulsbury Vol. 24, 4th
Edition at paragraph 955 where it provides (sic)
'Now, however, the test appears to be whether there is a
serious question to be tried. The mere fact that there is
a doubt as to the existence of the right which the plaintiff
is asserting is not sufficient to prevent the Court from
granting an interlocutory injunction although it is a matter
for serious attention. Where the application is to restrain
the exercise of an alleged right, the plaintiff should show
that there are substantive grounds for doubting the existence
of the right.'"
The
Court has discretion in granting interlocutory injunction.
As a matter of practice the Court will consider several
factors, the first two which will inveriably be dealt with
are:
(1) whether the substantive case raises a serious question,
that is, a serious triable issue, or not. If the case does
not raise serious triable issue, the application for interlocutory
injunction is refused forthwith. If the case raises serous
triable issue, the court proceeds to consider the likely
loss or hardship that may result if injunction is ordered
- it is considered at (b) below. In assessing serious issue
the court is not required to evaluate the evidence so as
to decide whether the plaintiff will succeed. There is no
requirement, no need, to look for evidence such as is sufficient
to establish prima facie case, because the
evidence at that stage is by affidavit and untested by oral
presentation and crossexamination. Yet to assess whether
the affidavit evidence has raised serious issue, the items
of evidence for both parties are compared so as to determine
whether the evidence for the applicant raises a case with
prospect of succeeding.
(2)
If the evidence for the applicant establishes a serious
issue, the court proceeds to consider the likely loss to
the respondent, in the event that interlocutory injunction
is imposed restraining him while the case proceeds to finality
and should the respondent finally win the case. If the respondent's
likely loss is one that monetary compensation will adequately
meet, then interlocutory injunction may be ordered, not
withstanding the likely loss, because final order for monetary
compensation in the substantive case will adequately cover
any likely loss. If monetary award will be inadequate or
inappropriate redress, interlocutory injunction order may
not be granted. In most cases, the applicant's likely loss
may also be such that monetary award will not be adequate
or appropriate compensation for. In such cases the court
compares the likely losses to each of the two sides, in
the event that the injunction is granted or not granted.
The comparison has become known as determining the balance
of convenience. I would say it is in fact balancing the
inconvenience rather than the convenience to the parties.
A third consideration may be necessary in the once in a
while case in which balancing the likely losses of the parties
does not show a greater likely loss to one of the parties.
In such a rare case, the court may look at the comparative
strength of the parties' cases.
A judgement
of Lord Diplock in a case from England (House of Lords),
American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396
or [1975] 1 ALL ER 504 outlined in detail the considerations
that the court bears in mind when exercising the discretion
to grant or not to grant interlocutory injunction order.
Determination
of the Application
In this application, it is my view that sufficient question,
that is, serious issue for trial, has been raised by McLaren
in his case to stop the use of what he says is his registered
business name. The affidavit evidence filed by Perdomo has
not made McLaren's case completely baseless. Perdomo concedes
that McLaren has duly registered the name, Belize Football
League, as his business name and that he, Perdomo, is using
the same name. Use of the same or identical business name
by two persons who will engage in businesses encompassing
the same activities is likely to confuse the public and
lead to loss of business to the one who has the right to
the name, because of the mistaken identity. There is a serious
question before the Court for consideration. Whether McLaren
will succeed is, of course, left for the final determination.
Perdomo's reason for using the name renders the issue in
the case worth due consideration and not baseless. An earlier,
somewhat similar case in which the issue was the use of
the same or similar name is Chateau Caribbean v Chateau
Caribbean Hotel Ltd [2000] 3BLR 268. Note however,
that the case was not about raising serious issue for deciding
whether interlocutory injunction would be ordered.
About
the contention that the case is vexatious, I would say that
the Court would not simply strike out the case on application,
it would most likely order consolidation of the two cases
Nos. 76 of 2001 and 155 of 2001 or at most, strike out the
later case, but grant leave to amend the defence in the
former to include counterclaim that avers the claims in
the latter case.
Having
decided that McLaren's case raises serious issue that will
be resolved at the final determination, I now have to consider
the likely losses to Perdomo, in the event that I order
interlocutory injunction enjoining him not to use the name,
Belize Football League, until the substantive case is finally
decided and should the case finally be decided in his favour.
Further, I have to decide whether the loss would be adequately
compensated for by an order to pay money, in the event that
the case is finally decided in favour of Perdomo. I have
also to consider the likely loss to McLaren in the event
that I do not impose interlocutory injunction on Perdomo
and should the case finally be decided in favour of McLaren.
According
to Perdomo's affidavit, he is currently organizing annual
tournaments, change of name will bring chaos and loss of
confidence, and players, coaches and other staff will lose
their jobs. McLaren says that although he has not started
business, he wants to use the name alone so that he can
start getting assistance even from outside Belize, he is
not much concerned about financial loss or gain, he would
like to start managing properly the sport of football which
he referred to as "the peoples' sport".
Having compared the two likely losses, I have to say that
Perdomo's loss would be the greater, in the event that the
substantive case ends in his favour. In my view, some of
the losses will be difficult to compensate monetarily, and
there may not be money to compensate for those that money
could compensate for. McLaren has stated that he would,
"abide by any order as to damages," but he has
not disclosed available means. His undertaking is not sufficient.
The
circumstances of the case are such that I have to refuse
the application of McLaren for interlocutory injunction.
Costs of the application only, is granted against McLaren
in favour of Perdomo.
The
facts of this case call for a speedy trial. I direct that
the two related cases No. 76 of 2001 and No. 155 of 2001
be listed in the near future for direction. Parties are
to attend on the Registrar within seven days to obtain a
mutually agreeable date for direction hearing before me.
Delivered
this Thursday the 5th day of April, 2001.
At
the Supreme Court, Belize City.
Sam
Lungole Awich
Judge
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