Inferior Court
Appeal No. 10 of 1979
21st March, 1980.
Moe, J.

Mr. Glenn Godfrey for the Appellant.

Criminal Law - Appeal from Inferior Court against conviction and sentence - Appellant convicted of unlawful entry upon private property in a threatening manner contrary to section 4(1) (XLIV) of the Summary Jurisdiction offences Ordinance, Cap 23 - What constitutes 'Unlawful entry upon Private Property' - What amounts to 'Threatening behaviours'.

J U D G M E N T

The Appellant was charged for that she, on the 18th day of January, 1979 at Belize City in the Belize Judicial District, unlawfully entered upon the private property of the Respondent situated at 21 Mosul Street in a threatening manner, contrary to section 4 (1) (XLIV) of the Summary Jurisdiction Offences Ordinance, Cap. 23. She was convicted of the offence and now appeals against the conviction on the ground that the decision of the magistrate was unreasonable and cannot be supported having regard to the evidence.

The evidence of the Respondent which the magistrate accepted as the truth showed that on the day in question while the Respondent was asleep in the house which he occupies, the Appellant entered the house, woke up the Respondent and said, "That focking girl you got over there, I will kick over the cart and kick her mada-rass over."

It was submitted that the evidence does not support a finding (i) that there was unlawful entry or (ii) that there was a threatening manner on the part of the Appellant. Dealing with the second limb first it was argued that the words used by the Appellant do not amount to a threat and reliance was placed on the dicta of Lush, J. in Wood v. Bowron (1866) L. R. 2 Q. B. 21 at p. 30 where he said "It is the very essence of a threat that it should be made for the purpose of intimidating or overcoming the will of the person to whom it is addressed." To that may be added that, while threatening conduct will normally involve a threat of physical harm to the person addressed, this need not necessarily always be so; for a threat of harm to a third person may, in appropriate circumstances, amount to threatening behaviour. The magistrate had the circumstances placed before him and it was for him to determine whether the conduct of the Appellant fell within the definition of threatening behaviour. In my view, there was enough evidence on which he could have found that the words used were for the purpose emaciated by Lush, J. (ibid).

With respect to the first limb of the appeal, it was contended that there was no evidence to show that the Appellant had been forbidden to enter the premises. This was necessary since permission to enter premises may be implied. The magistrate found that the Appellant entered without being invited to do so and without having any lawful business therein. The evidence is that the Respondent was asleep inside his house. His sister was in the yard. The Appellant entered the house by opening the front door and woke up the Respondent and used the language concerned. In my view, the evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the entry was without lawful justification or excuse.

The behaviour of the Appellant is the very kind of behaviour legislated against by section 4 (XLIV) of Cap. 23 and I see no reason to disturb the conviction.

Appeal dismissed.

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