|
(RUDOLPH
MOSES |
PLAINTIFF |
BETWEEN
|
(
(AND
(
|
|
|
(THE
BELIZE ELECTRICITY BOARD |
DEFENDANT |
Supreme
Court
Action No. 126 of 1978
30th May, 1980.
Barrington-Jones, J.
Mr. Dean
Barrow for the Plaintiff.
Mr. D. B. Courtenay for the Defendant.
Claim
for damages for wrongful termination of contract of employment
- Dismissal of Plaintiff after Plaintiff charged with criminal
offence arising out of irregular purchase of 300 feet of
company's concentric cable by Plaintiff from fellow employee
- Plaintiff subsequently acquitted of charge - Termination
of contracts for good and sufficient cause - Section 46
of Labour Ordinance 1959 - Section 46(2)(a) - Board had
good and sufficient cause to dismiss Plaintiff without notice
on grounds of misconduct - Plaintiff's claim for matured
benefit under Provident Fund Scheme fails as such benefit
only accrued if Plaintiff had continued in Board's employment
for 10 years - Plaintiff's claim dismissed - costs awarded
to Board.
J U D G M E N T
The Plaintiff
took out a Writ on the 11th July, 1978 claiming damages for
the wrongful termination of a contract of employment between
the Plaintiff and the Defendant.
Briefly
what happened here was that the Plaintiff, who was a linesman
in the employ of the Belize Electricity Board, was suspended
in June, 1977 pending the hearing and determination of a criminal
charge in the Magistrates' Court. It subsequent1y transpired
that the Plaintiff was acquitted of the charge and it appears
that he returned to work on the 1st August, 1977, but was
told to leave and to await word from the Defendant Board (hereinafter
referred to as "the Board"). It is the Plaintiff's
case that on or about the 26th October, 1977 he received a
letter from the Board notifying him of his dismissal from
the Board's employment with effect the 4th August, l977. The
Plaintiff alleges that the dismissal was wrongful and without
good cause and that, in any event, it could not take effect
retroactively from the 4th August, 1977. It was in these circumstances
that the Plaintiff alleged that he had suffered loss and damage.
It is
the Board's case that the Plaintiff on an unknown date in
late 1976 or in 1977 dishonestly converted to his own use
and wrongfully deprived the Board of 300' concentric cable
which was the Board's property and that ,as a result, the
Plaintiff was discharged from the Board's employ.
The Plaintiff
in evidence readily admitted that he had obtained such concentric
cable but said it was roughly 100', and admitted that he had
installed it at "Diab's Place", saying that he had
obtained this wiring from the second man in charge of the
Board's meter section store, Mr. Randolph Bradley and had
paid Mr. Bradley about $125 in cash for it, but that he did
not receive any receipt picking up the cable from Mr. Bradley's
house. The Plaintiff said that he told Mr. Topsy (one of the
Board's employees) where he had obtained the cable and that
as a result he was taken to the Board's offices and was there
interviewed by the Board's Personnel Officer Mr. Lizama and
says Mr. Bradley was also called in and questioned. The Plaintiff
said that after being questioned he went back to work but
that three or four days later he received a letter from the
Board dated the 18th July, 1977 informing him that with effect
the 19th July, 1977 he was placed on suspension at half rate
pending the outcome of a prosecution before the Courts. The
Plaintiff said that he was later jointly prosecuted with Bradley
but that they were both subsequently acquitted. The Plaintiff
did not give the date of his Court appearance but this date
appears to be the 29th July, 1977. He said that he returned
to work the same afternoon and collected his pay; and that
he worked the next day, which was a Saturday, but that on
his return to work on the following Monday he was informed
by the linesman then in charge that he was to go home until
he heard from the Board. The Plaintiff then left the Board's
premises and went to the offices of the General Workers' Development
Union of Belize and did not return to the Board's employ.
It was
the Plaintiff's evidence that the next intimation he had was
a letter from the Board which was posted to him; this letter
is dated the 4th August, 1977, but the Plaintiff says that
he only received it in October, 1977. The Plaintiff said that
he is positive of this because it was enclosed with a letter
concerning his electricity account dated 26th October, 1977.
The Plaintiff
says that he was not paid anything further by the Board after
the receipt of the letter dated 4th August, 1977 and was only
paid at half rate up to the end of July.
In cross
- examination the Plaintiff admitted that the concentric cable
that he purchased from Bradley was stamped with the mark 'B.
E. B.'; and admitted that as far as he knew this type of cable
was only kept at the Board's store.
In further
cross-examination the Plaintiff agreed with Mr. Courtenay
that Bradley was not a man who sold the Board's stores, but
said that he did not think it was irregular to approach Bradley
for the purchase of the concentric cable. He said that he
did not worry about a receipt, and did not think that he might
get into trouble if he did not obtain a receipt for the wiring
from the Board. The Plaintiff admitted that he sold the wiring
to Diab for $200, giving him a receipt for the payment. Two
receipts were exhibited by the Plaintiff addressed to Nasser
Diab - one dated the 8th January, 1977 for $l50 and another
dated 10th January, 1977 for $210.
The Plaintiff,
when asked about the interview at the Board's offices, disclosed
that when Bradley was asked whether he had sold such concentric
cable to the Plaintiff he had denied it. In answer to the
proposition that the Plaintiff could not take the Board' s
property and use it on a private job, the Plaintiff replied
'yes'. When asked why he had not gone to the Board's retail
store for the cable the Plaintiff replied that it was not
sold at that outlet. The Plaintiff disclosed that when he
went to the Union offices he asked the Union to represent
him in the matter of his suspension by the Board; and admitted
that between the 1st August, 1977 and the 26th October 1977
he was in frequent touch with the Union; and that officials
of the Union had told him that they had received a copy of
the Plaintiff's letter of dismissal. He said that the Union
had received their copy before he received the original of
the letter of dismissal; but admitted that he had had earlier
sight of the Union's copy of his letter of dismissal; although
maintaining that he did not actually receive the original
until on or after the 26th October, 1977. The Plaintiff, at
this point in the proceedings, produced the 'account' from
the Board which he says was enclosed with his letter of dismissal.
In fact it is not an account but a letter from the Financial
Comptroller of the Board drawing attention to an outstanding
balance of $145.34 and this letter is dated the 26th October,
1977. It was put to the Plaintiff that the letter of dismissal
dated the 4th August, 1977 and the letter regarding his account
dated the 26th October, 1977 were dispatched and received
separately by the Plaintiff to which the Plaintiff replied
that they came together in one envelope.
The Plaintiff
agreed that he approached Bradley during working hours for
the concentric cable and admitted that he had paid for this
cable and collected it at Bradley's house. The Plaintiff said
that he did not think that it was irregular to pay for and
collect the Board's cable at Bradley's house. The Plaintiff
denied that he had acted wrongly in the way he had obtained
the concentric cable from Bradley; and admitted that he knew
that the Board never sells its concentric cable. The Plaintiff
said that he knew now that Bradley should never have given
him the cable and said that he would not do it again.
So that
in brief, was the evidence of the Plaintiff.
The termination
of contracts for good and sufficient cause are set out in
section 46 of the Labour Ordinance, 1959 and section 46 (2)
(a) provides good and sufficient cause for dismissal shall
include dismissal when a worker is guilty of misconduct, whether
in the course of his duties or not, inconsistent with the
fulfillment of the express or implied conditions of his contract
of service.
In my
view, the Board had good and sufficient cause to dismiss the
Plaintiff without notice on the grounds of misconduct and
I find that he must have known that he was misconducting himself
when he sought to purchase some of the Board's concentric
wire marked with the Board's mark from a fellow employee at
the Board's premises; such purported purchase being effected
and paid for at the home of Bradley. That, taken with the
Plaintiff's admission that he knew the Board never sold its
concentric cable, leads me to find that his dismissal was
lawful and with good cause.
In considering
the Plaintiff's allegation that the letter of dismissal dated
the 4th August, 1977 was received in the same envelope as
the letter regarding his account dated the 26th October, 1977,
I take particular note that the former letter is signed by
the Admin/Personnel Officer whereas the latter is signed by
the Financial Comptroller some two months later. In the last
analysis I do not believe the Plaintiff's evidence on this
point and find that the letter of dismissal was written to
him on 4th August, 1977 and posted thereafter and was probably
received a few days later. I further find that the letter
regarding his account was written on the 26th October, 1977
and posted thereafter to the Plaintiff.
In any
event, I am quite satisfied that the Plaintiff knew of the
contents of the letter of dismissal in early August, 1977
when he saw it through the medium of the Union to whom a copy
had been sent; moreover there is no requirement in law that
a dismissal shall be in writing.
In connection
with monies owing to the Plaintiff, the Board admits that
a total of $345.72 is due to the Plaintiff, and this should
be paid to the Plaintiff as soon as possible after the delivery
of this judgment.
I now
turn to deal with the Plaintiff's claim for matured benefit
under the Provident Fund Scheme. Here I find myself satisfied
that the scheme is such that it is limited to employees who
complete ten years service, the Plaintiff appears to have
served less than that period. Mr. Courtenay cited the case
of Ward v Barclay Perkins and Co. Ltd. (1939) 1 All
E. R. 287 where it was held that such a stipulation could
not be implied in a contract unless, on the evidence, it was
shown to have been mutually intended, and necessary to give
business efficacy to the document. This could not be said
in the present case, and the Plaintiff failed in his Action.
On this
authority and having held that the Plaintiff's dismissal was
lawful and with good cause I further find that the Plaintiff
is not entitled to any matured benefit under the Provident
Fund Scheme; such benefit only accruing if the Plaintiff had
continued in the Board's employment for ten years.
The Plaintiff's
claim must therefore be dismissed. The Board to have costs.
Costs
to be taxed by the Register.
----------OO----------
|