Supreme Court
Action No. 132 of 1979
22nd May, 1981.
Moe, J.

Mr. Philip Goldson for the Plaintiff.
Mr. R Rajasingham, Solicitor General, for the Defendants.

Claim for damages for unlawful detention of outboard motor - Plaintiff charged with unlawful possession of outboard motor - Charge subsequently dismissed - Motor in possession of police from March 1977 to May 1978 - Claim for loss of income - Motor previously used by Plaintiff in making living as fisherman; claim for value of motor as it did not work upon return and for interference with proprietary rights - General damages assessed at $1000.00 - Special damages proven and awarded in the sum of $2808.22 - Judgment for Plaintiff in sum of $3808.22 with interest thereon at 6% - Costs awarded.

J U D G M E N T

In these proceedings the Plaintiff claims damages for the unlawful detention of his outboard motor during the period 10th March, 1977 to 29th May, 1978 by the Defendants. In his Statement of Claim he averred that:

(1) On March 10, 1977 the third Defendant who was the Inspector of Police and agent and/or servant of the first two Defendants, seized a 25 horsepower outboard motor owned and used by the Plaintiff in the course of his trade as a fisherman.

(2) The third Defendant arrested the Plaintiff on a charge of unlawful possession of the said motor.

(3) The charge against the Plaintiff was dismissed by a Magistrate of the Inferior Court of Belize for want of prosecution by the Police.

(4) Despite written and verbal requests made to the second and third Defendants the said outboard motor was not returned to the Plaintiff until the 29th day of May, 1978 in a deteriorated condition and of no use to the Plaintiff.

In the Defence filed, the Defendants admitted as set out in particulars (1) to (4) above. They, however, set up that the detention of the motor was justifiable as the third named Defendant was acting lawfully and in support of the criminal law. They further specifically denied that the detention of the said motor resulted in the Plaintiff incurring substantial loss of income as a fisherman or any loss at all. The evidence of the Plaintiff, not challenged, was that the case brought against him was dismissed on the 30th March, 1977.

It appears unnecessary for me to determine whether the detention of the motor on the 10th March, 1977 was unlawful or not. While in the Statement of Claim the Plaintiff claimed damages resulting from the detention of the motor from the 10th March 1977 to May 29th, 1978, in his evidence he stated he was claiming damages from the 11th September, 1977 counsel for the Plaintiff conceded that March 10th, 1977 to September 10th was a period during which the detention could be said to have been in execution of the law.

Nor is it necessary to determine whether the detention of the motor after the 11th September, 1977 was unlawful or not. Counsel for the Defendant conceded that the detention after September 11th was improper and submitted that if the Plaintiff has established loss, he is entitled to damages after that date.

I therefore proceed to determine the damages to which the Plaintiff is entitled for the detention of his motor from the 11th September, 1977 to 29th May, 1978. He has claimed as special damages:-

(a) loss of income for the period March 10, 1977 to May 29, 1978;

(b) the value of the 25 horsepower outboard motor; and

(c) interference with his proprietary rights for a period of 170 days at $10.00 per day.

The Plaintiff established that he suffered a loss of income for the period 1st April, 1977 to 31st March, 1978 and the Court was satisfied that the loss was as a result of his motor having been detained by the Defendants. The evidence showed that for that twelve-month period 1st April - 31st March he could earn $23,975. 36. The evidence further showed that for the specific period 1st April, 1977 to 31st March, 1978, he earned $13,126.04. It was of course conceded by the Plaintiff that his claim would have to be adjusted to take into account the period 29th March to 11th September, 1977 when the Police may be held to be properly in possession of the motor. There was evidence that the Plaintiff obtained a motor in November 1977 and was earning from then onwards. I therefore determined that his loss of income was to be calculated from September 12th, 1977 to November, 1977 or over a two month period. Using the sum of $10,849.32 as the loss for the twelve-month period, for the two - month period his loss would be $1,808.22.

With regard to the claim for the loss of the motor it was submitted for the Defendants that the evidence does not support a finding that the Plaintiff lost the motor, i.e. that it was of no use when it was returned to him. The Plaintiff said in his evidence, "when I got back the motor it was in a deteriorated condition. I couldn't use it. It was completely destroyed. An engine used in salt water and serviced, washed and oiled could last a very long time. But the salt collected in it and corroded the parts. All the movable parts were completely destroyed. When they brought it, I tried to crank it on the street side. I pulled the cord but it couldn't work. I refused to accept it because it wasn't in satisfactory condition. This happened in the morning. I consulted my lawyer and as a result I received it. Since then I took it down and tried it. It wouldn't work." He however admitted in cross-examination that since he received back the motor he did not complain to anybody in authority either by himself or through his lawyer that it has been destroyed. It was contended that in addition to this fact is the fact that the notice of intended claim against the police sent out by his Attorney-at-Law after the motor was returned makes no reference to the loss of the motor but rather specifically refers to the purchase price of the motor which he had obtained for use as indicated earlier. It may be added that since the evidence showed that this matter was pursued so assiduously from May 1977 that it may be considered peculiar that no mention is made to the authorities about the state in which they returned the item concerned. However on careful consideration what is raised seems to point to an omission on the part of the Attorney-at-Law and not to rejection of the Plaintiff's case. The Plaintiff said he tried to start the motor, it would not work and he got in touch with his lawyer. As a result, he received the engine. In addition, it seemed that in all probability, the motor not used for fourteen months would have been in the condition described by the Plaintiff. Finally there is nothing from the Defendants indicating the return by them of the item in the condition in which it was taken or even an acknowledgement by the Plaintiff of a return in such condition. The manner of dealing with the motor lent further weight to the Plaintiff's claim. I accepted the Plaintiff's claim and allowed the amount claimed $1,000.00.

The Plaintiff did not satisfy the Court as is required on items of special damage what was the damage in regard to the claim for interference with proprietary rights. I ,however, took into account some loss in this regard in assessing general damages.

I bore in mind the manner of dealing with the Plaintiff's motor and the whole circumstances surrounding the detention of it, the inconvenience to which the Plaintiff was put and the interference with his use of his property generally. I award the sum of $1,000.00 general damages.

Judgment then for the Plaintiff in the sum of $3,808.22 with interest thereon at 6% from 14th July, 1979 date of service of the Writ.

He is to have his costs.

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