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(JOSE
CHAN |
PLAINTIFF |
BETWEEN |
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(AND
(
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(JOHN
GONZALEZ |
DEFENDANT |
Supreme
Court
Action No. 150 of 1981
7th February, 1984.
Moe, J.
Mr. N.
Dujon for the Plaintiff
Mr. Denys Barrow for the Defendant
Assessment
of damages for loss of cane destroyed by fire started by
Plaintiff - Special duty to guard against spread of fire
Quantum of damages - How assessed.
JUDGMENT
In this
Action the Plaintiff claimed damages for the loss and damage
he sustained as a result of the burning of his cane field
due to the negligence of the Defendant, his servants or agents.
The Defendant while admitting the burning of the Plaintiff's
canes denied that it was caused by his negligence or that
of his servants or agents.
The evidence
was clear that the Plaintiff's canes in a field adjacent to
and west of the Fox Highway were burnt on the 11th February,
1981. There was also evidence which I accepted that canes
in a field of the Defendant burnt on the said 11th February,
and there was a trace of fire between that field of the Defendant
and the Plaintiff's field which burnt. I also accepted the
evidence that there were signs that the fire had traveled
from the Defendant's field to the Plaintiffs field. In addition
I found that the Defendant admitted to the Plaintiff that
the fire in the Plaintiff's field came from his (the Defendant's)
field.
There
was undisputed evidence that the Defendant and his workers
burnt a field of his on the night of the 10th February, 1981.
The Plaintiff's evidence was that he couldn't say whether
the fire in that field was extinguished that night. The Defendant
said in examination-in-Chief that the field was completely
out before he and his workers left that night. I found that
assertion of the Defendant to be qualified by his admission
in cross-examination that they burnt at night and couldn't
see if the area he wanted to burn was all burnt. I drew the
inference that it was also probable that he nor his workers
could see whether all fire was out. i.e. they might have been
embers. A field beside that field burnt on the 11th. There
was a trace of ashes from the field partially burnt on the
10th to the field burnt on the 11th. On the evidence left
before me I came to the conclusion that the burning on the
11th was a result of the burning on the 10th which itself
was due to a deliberate act of the Defendant's workers. This
act of burning was on the instruction and under supervision
of the Defendant himself.
Fire is
a dangerous thing and the law recognizes a special duty to
guard against an escape of fire. See Balfour v. Barty-King
[1957] 1 Q.B. 496. There was a duty on the Defendant and
his workers to take care to ensure that the fire which they
caused on the Defendant's land did not spread to the Plaintiff's
field. This they failed to do. I held the Defendant liable
for the damage caused to the Plaintiff's canes by the fire
which spread from the Defendant's field to the Plaintiff's
field.
Thirty
acres of canes of the Plaintiff were burnt. I found that the
Plaintiff did not get returns from 15 of those acres. Those
acres would have produced 300 tons of cane from which the
plaintiff could have earned $16,347.00. Evidence was that
his expenses would have been $20.00 on every ton. His net
returns would therefore have been $10,347.00. I award him
the sum of $10,347.00 damages and he is to have his costs.
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