Supreme Court
Appeal No. 20 of 1982
28th April, 1983
Moe, J.

Mr. Denys Barrow for the Appellant
Mr. G. Quallo for the Respondent

Inferior Court Appeal - Traffic Accident - Appeal against conviction - Whether the Magistrate's finding was unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence - Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Regulations - Evidence sufficient to support Magistrate's findings - Appeal dismissed - Costs.

D E C I S I O N

The Appellant was convicted of the following offence: - That on the 16th day of December, 1981 at Belize City in the Belize Judicial District being the driver of a motor vehicle namely motor car BZ-C-2175 on a road to wit:- Freetown Road when altering its direction left from Freetown Road into the drive way of the Belize Technical College failed to give way to motor cycle No. 24 which was travelling on Freetown Road, contrary to Regulation 115 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Regulations.

Regulation 115 provides as follows:

The burden of ascertaining whether the road be clear in every direction shall rest with the driver of a motor vehicle which alters its speed or direction and the driver of such vehicle shall give way to other vehicles.

The evidence is that the Appellant was driving her car on Freetown Road and a Police Constable was travelling behind her on a motorcycle. The Appellant was aware of the presence of the motorcycle travelling behind her. About 100 yards from the North entrance to Belize Technical College, Appellant indicated her intention to turn left into the Belize Technical College compound by putting on her left mechanical indicator. She checked oncoming traffic and saw a P.W.D. truck about 100 yards to her front approaching. She checked behind her and saw that the Police Constable was about 20 feet behind her. The Police Constable on reaching near the Technical College decided to overtake the Appellant's car. He was about 25 feet behind the car when the car turned left and the motorcycle collided into the left side of the car. The indication to turn left was not seen by the policeman because he was gazing.

The magistrate held that the Appellant had not discharged the burden in Regulation 115 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Regulations and that she ought to have given way to the motorcycle behind her.

The Appellant now appeals against the conviction on three grounds: -

(1) The decision was unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence.

(2) The decision was erroneous in point of law in that the magistrate erred in holding that there was an absolute requirement on the part of a driver changing direction to avoid an accident; and

(3) The decision was based on a wrong principle or was such that the magistrate viewing the circumstances reasonably could not properly have so decided.

Each of these grounds was urged as a separate ground for attacking the magistrate's finding that the Appellant ought to have given way.

It is not being disputed that there was a duty on the Appellant to ascertain that the road was clear and the magistrate directed himself that there is such a duty. In his statement of reasons he said "It seems quite clear to me that the burden to make sure that the road is clear before a driver changes direction on that road rests solely with such driver ---." After adverting to the evidence he said "One is not absolved from the absolute requirement of the regulation by merely indicating one's intention to change direction." I do not see that anything turns on the use of the word "absolute." It is correct that a driver does not discharge the burden placed on him by Regulation 115 by merely indicating his intention to change direction. I do not find that the magistrate misdirected himself as to the law.

The question left is whether the magistrate's finding was unreasonable and could not be supported having regard to the evidence. The Appellant attacks the magistrate's finding that she should have given way in this way: - That the magistrate gave the term "give way" the meaning "allow vehicles to pass" and therefore by his finding it would mean: -

(1) Regulation would be demanding an impossible traffic situation since it would be gratuitous for a vehicle in such a situation to stop and secondly, the way available to driver in these circumstances is the right hand side of the road. That the evidence shows the Appellant ascertained the road was clear and gave way.

Now the evidence is clear that the Appellant ascertained there were other vehicles on the road, and that she was altering her direction. By Regulation 115 she had a duty to give way, which means, as the magistrate held, allow other vehicles to proceed. This meaning is evident when the regulation is interpreted in the context of the whole set of regulations wherein the term is used elsewhere to have that very meaning: To allow other vehicles to proceed must mean to allow them to proceed as required by the law. The Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Regulations require a vehicle passing another vehicle from behind or overtaking it, to pass the other vehicle to its left or offside. See Regulation 114(2) (a). In fulfilling her duty to let other vehicles pass or to give way to them, the Appellant was required to let the motorcycle pass on her left or offside. This she did not do. She ascertained the motorcycle was behind her and at a time when it was about 20 feet behind her she turned left and there was collision on her left or offside.

There was ample evidence on which the magistrate could come to his finding that the Appellant did not give way to other vehicles and his finding must be supported. The appeal fails. Appellant to pay costs of the appeal.

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