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(SEFARINA
ENCALADA |
PLAINTIFF
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BETWEEN
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(ALLAN
FOREMAN
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DEFENDANT
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Supreme
Court
Action No. 211 of 1978
11th January, 1979
Staine, J.
Mr. Dean
Barrow for the Plaintiff
Mr. Raymond H. Barrow for the Defendant
Injunction
- Principles to be applied - Doctrine of laches - Delay
defeats equity - Undue delay defeats equitable claim - Motion
dismissed.
J U D G M E N T
By this
motion the Plaintiff seeks an injunction to restrain the Defendant
from continuing to maintain piers and a dive shop and from
continuing to build a restaurant and bar so as to become a
nuisance to the Plaintiff.
The evidence
in support of the motion has been given by one Affidavit sworn
to by the Plaintiff who resides at the Corner of Hyde's Lane
and New Road in Belize City, and is the owner and occupier
of a dwelling house and house an beach front property situated
at San Pedro, Ambergris Caye. The Defendant is the owner of
a hotel situated behind her property.
Sometime
in 1978, the Defendant built a pier leading into the sea and
a dive shop at the end of the pier, directly off the Plaintiff's
property at Ambergris Caye.
The Defendant
has ,since that time, commenced building another pier off
the front of the Plaintiff's property, and also started building
a restaurant and bar next to the first pier and dive shop.
The Plaintiff,
therefore, moves the Court to obtain an injunction as aforesaid.
In answer
to the Plaintiff, the Defendant has filed an Affidavit in
which he alleges that he is in the tourist business and that
the first pier and dive shop are used in providing services
which the tourist business offers to customers, and that the
first pier was in fact built in November 1977.
The Defendant
also alleges that the area of beach land used for swimming
by the public abuts the Plaintiff's property, but is the property
of the Crown. He further traverses other allegations contained
in the Plaintiff's Affidavit.
The matters
have been fully argued before this Court by Mr. Dean Barrow
for the Plaintiff and by Mr. D.B. Courtenay for the Defendant.
It is
clear from the Affidavits and the arguments adduced that there
are serious issues to be tried, but the Court is not in a
position to resolve the conflicts raised by the Affidavits,
nor should it attempt to do so. See American Cyanamid v.
Ethicon Ltd. (1975) 2 W.L.R.
But there
are matters raised on the face of the Affidavit which do not
require the evaluation of the evidence at present before the
Court.
It is
noted that it is not disputed that the Defendant is in the
tourist trade and that the first pier used in connection with
that business was built in 1977 or 1978; the year does not
matter. What matters is at the time of the construction of
the first pier, the Plaintiff apparently took no steps to
redress what she now terms an infringement of her legal rights.
She now seeks an injunction to restrain the Defendant from
using this first pier and the restaurant.
An injunction
is an equitable remedy, and like all equitable remedies it
must be quickly claimed, otherwise the doctrine of laches
and the maxim, "Delay defeats equity" will attach
to its operation. Were the Court to grant an injunction at
this stage restraining the Defendant from using this first
pier and restaurant, it would mean that the Court would in
effect be depriving him of the use and enjoyment of something
he has had for sometime. Furthermore, the Defendant being
in the tourist business, were the Court now to enjoin him
from maintaining this first pier and restaurant, at a time
when the tourist season is about to commence, it would mean
the Defendant was being deprived of a means of livelihood
and a living. If the allegations contained in paragraph 8
of the Plaintiff's Affidavit can be taken literally, then
it is all the more difficult to appreciate the delay in bringing
this matter before the Court with a view to seeking relief.
Turning
to the second pier being built, it is noted that there is
one motion before the Court seeking to restrain the main tenance
and building of two piers. It is therefore not possible to
deal with the motion as if it were applications in respect
of separate piers.
Further,
the defendant's Affidavit deposed to having removed the second
pier from in front of the plaintiff's property. If this is
so then there is no matter of complaint in this respect. This
is made all the more the case when it is noted that the Plaintiff
resided in Belize City and I have not had to consider the
question of nuisance or other matter of law.
I would
dismiss this motion on the grounds of undue delay defeating
an equitable claim, and on the grounds that if a question
of nuisance arises it can be properly remedied by awarding
damages.
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