Supreme Court
Appeal No. 21 of 1982
6th May, 1983.
Alcantara, J.

Mr. P. S.W. Goldson for Appellant.
Mr. Allan G. Quallo for Respondent.

Appeal from conviction in Inferior Court under s. 10(2) of the Control of Public Meetings and Public Procession Ordinance No. 14/67 - Complaint that Magistrate returned verdict of not guilty and then reopened case and changed verdict to guilty - Challenge to conduct of Magistrate - Ground rejected - Only way to question conduct of Magistrate is by means of one of the prerogative writs or possibly under Section 142 of the Supreme Court Ordinance - Meaning of "public procession" - Governing word "orderly" - Evidence not disclosing that there was movement in orderly succession - Evidence not in support of offence charged - Appeal allowed on this ground - Matter taking 18 months to be heard - Lapse of time unacceptable - Criminal cases to be promptly heard - Particularly for minor offences.

J U D G M E N T

This is an appeal from the Inferior Court in the Belize Judicial District. The Defendant/Appellant was charged with an offence under section 10(2) of the Control of Public Meetings and Public Procession Ordinance No. 14/67. The particulars of the offence reads as follows: -

"For that the said Gerald Hinkson on the 31st day of March, 1981, at Belize City in the Belize Judicial District, took part in a Public Procession through the streets of Belize City leading to the Labour Department Building on Queen Street and Ministry of Works Stores on Gabourel Lane, for which a permit has not been granted."

On the 5th October 1982 the charge was heard. The Appellant was found guilty, convicted and fined $25. From the said conviction he now appeals. There are two grounds of appeal.

" (a) The decision could not be supported having regard to the evidence.
(b) That the Magistrate committed a specific illegality in that he rendered a verdict of "Not Guilty" after which he received submissions from the Prosecution and then altered his verdict to Guilty"

Corresponding to paragraph (h) and (k) of section 130 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Ordinance.

One thing that arises immediately is whether ground (b) is a proper ground for appeal under the present appeal. What the Appellant is alleging is that the learned Magistrate, after having become functus officio by giving a verdict of not guilty, re-opened the case and brought a verdict of guilty. This is not apparent in the face of the record before me, but there is an Affidavit of Mr. Philip S. W. Goldson to that effect, but which does not really support what ground (b) alleges. It appears to me that what is being questioned is not the adjudication of the Inferior Court but the conduct of the learned Magistrate at the hearing.

A not dissimilar situation arose in the case of Phyllis Clarke v Margaret Williams, Inferior Court Appeal No. 16 of 1982, the relevant part of the judgment of this Court reads as follows: -

"The appellant was dissatisfied with the decision and with the reasons for decision and has put forward six grounds of appeal. The sixth ground of appeal is stated thus:
"Evidence was wrongly rejected by the Inferior Court when the learned Magistrate refused to allow the complainant to call a police officer to give evidence on her behalf."

In support of this ground, the Appellant seeks to introduce two affidavits, one by the Appellant herself and the other by an attorney who just happened to be present in Court, purporting to prove that the learned Magistrate refused to allow a witness to go into the box. Stated thus, what is in issue is not really the adjudication of the Inferior Court but the conduct of the learned Magistrate at the hearing. And if his conduct is in issue, then he should have an opportunity to defend himself. This he would be able to do if the appeal had been in the form of a motion for one of the prerogative Writs, mandamus or certiorari. In such a case, Affidavit evidence would have been clearly admissible on the motion not only on behalf of the Appellant but on behalf of the learned Magistrate. It is highly dangerous to allow Affidavit evidence in the present appeal (it is even doubtful whether it is admissible, in any case) when Counsel for the Respondent has informed the Court that what really happened was that the learned Magistrate did not forbid a witness being called but refused an adjournment to produce a witness, i.e. the police officer.

I am satisfied that ground six is not a proper ground under the present appeal. If the Appellant wanted to pursue it, she should have applied for one of the prerogative Writs or possibly under section 142 of the Supreme Court Ordinance. I have also come to the conclusion that the affidavits sought to be put forward are not admissible under the present appeal. Consequently, I reject ground six."

I am still of the same opinion. The only way to question the conduct of the learned Magistrate is by means of one of the prerogative Writs so that he has an opportunity of being heard, either by Affidavit evidence or otherwise.

I reject ground (b) of this appeal.

I proceed now to ground (a). I have read the Reasons for the Decision and have come to the conclusion that the learned Magistrate properly directed himself initially as to the meaning of public procession. This is what he had to say: -

"As to the law, in regard to the first, the Ordinance in the interpretation part states, 'public procession' means any procession in, to or from a public place. This definition is in terms of the adjective "public" and the noun "procession" is left to be construed according to its ordinary meaning. The dictionary (Concise Oxford) meaning of the word 'procession' is "proceeding of a body of persons in orderly succession."

I agree with the learned Magistrate. Where I disagree is with the next sentence where, for the sake of elucidation, he gives his own definition and leaves out the word 'orderly'. This is what he says:

"What is really important in its ordinary meaning of procession is that there must be movement of a collection of people from one place to another, obviously for a common purpose."

The definition of 'procession' in my edition, the 6th, of the Oxford Concise is more illuminating. It is a 'proceeding of body of persons (or of boats etc.) in orderly succession, especially as religious ceremony or political demonstration or in festive occasion." I am of the view that the governing word is 'orderly succession'.

The evidence adduced is that what happened that day was anything other than orderly. It was a crowd which moved from one place to the other with the avowed purpose of making a strike effective. No evidence that there was movement in orderly succession. Inspector Cetina, the only relevant witness, just saw a crowd moving away.

It is not for this Court to decide whether the strike was justified or not, or whether the picketing was legal or illegal. Neither am I concerned whether the crowd inside the Ministry of Works entrance was an unlawful assembly or not. Nor am I concerned whether the people there were guilty of an unnecessary obstruction. The Appellant was not charged under the Trade Unions Ordinance, nor under any other law, but under section 10(2) of the Control of Public Meetings and Public Procession Ordinance.

I came to the conclusion that the evidence does not support that there was a public procession. Consequently, the appeal succeeds.

There is one other matter which gives me cause for concern. This alleged offence took place on March 31, 1981. The information was laid on the 23rd April 1981. It did not come to hearing until the 5th October 1982 - a lapse of more than 18 months. This fact was alluded to by Counsel for the Appellant before the Inferior Court and today before me alleging that there had been fifteen adjournments, all at the request of the Prosecution. Whatever reasons there might have been for the delay, I am of the opinion that such a lapse of time is unacceptable, especially when dealing with minor offences, such as this one. Criminal cases should be promptly heard. It is one of the ways to enhance the administration of justice.
Section 6 (2) of the Constitution of Belize reads:

"If any person is charged with a criminal offence, then, unless the charge is withdrawn, the case shall be afforded a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established by law."

The question that might arise is whether a delay of one and a half years for this particular offence was unreasonable. That issue is not before me for two reasons. First, there is in this appeal no reference under section 96 of the Constitution, and secondly, the Constitution was not in force when the offence is alleged to have taken place.

Appeal allowed with costs.

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