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(CRECENCIO
ALAMINA |
PLAINTIFF
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BETWEEN |
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(AND
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(MARIANO
CAMAL
( and
(VICTOR TURNELL
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DEFENDANTS |
Supreme
Court
Action No. 259 of 1981
19th September, 1983.
Rajasingham, J., Q.C.
Messrs.
Pitts & Elrington for the Plaintiff.
Messrs. W.H. Courtenay & Co. for the Defendants.
Tort
- Negligence - Contributory negligence by Plaintiff in motor
vehicle accident - Unlighted motor vehicle on highway at
night prima facie, but rebuttable, evidence of negligence.
RULING
The Plaintiff's
Action is for damages arising from a collision involving his
car and a crane belonging to the second Defendant and driven
at the time of the collision by the first Defendant. Actually
the crane was not, according to both parties, being driven
at the time of the collision but was parked without lights
at about 7.30 p.m. on the 3rd of July, 1980, on the Northern
Highway. The statement of claim is rather inaccurately worded
and even speaks of the crane having been "negligently"
driven and "caused (it) to collide violently with the
Plaintiff's said motor car". The Plaintiff himself does
not speak of the crane as in motion at the time of the collision.
The Plaintiff's
uncontradicted evidence is that he was travelling at between
45 and 50 miles per hour approaching Belize City along the
Northern Highway on a dark and, off and on, rainy night when
he had to dip his lights for an oncoming car and move over
to his extreme right. There is nothing to indicate that he
altered speed. As he proceeded towards the approaching car
he saw a dark object loom up before him and braked hard, causing
the car to skid. He says he then realised that his braking
was useless because he was too close to it, and released his
brakes and tried to avoid the object by steering hard to his
left but the rear right fender of his car hit the left rear
of the object and that caused him to go off the road on his
left. The oncoming car then ran into him, its right front
alone being partly off the paved area and on the soft shoulder
while Plaintiff's car was wholly on the soft shoulder - the
Plaintiff referred to it as 'mud". The Plaintiff gave
his reason for turning left and into the path of the oncoming
car as being his fear that if he went off the road on the
right and into the bush he may hit a tree and cause injury
to someone. The damage caused to his vehicle was so extensive
as to render it uneconomical to repair.
The first
Defendant's evidence is also largely uncontradicted. He said
he had worked with the crane at Airport Camp and had left
there for Belize City. When he left he had put on his lights
because, it was dark already, and had found that they were
in working condition. He proceeded towards Belize City and
had passed an S bend and reached halfway down a straight half
mile stretch of road. At that point he saw an oncoming car
and dipped his headlights. When he dipped his lights his lights
cut out altogether. He said he could see the white gravel
edge of the road and pulled over to it. This is challenged
by the Plaintiff who says the Defendant's vehicle was about
four and a half feet from the edge of the paved area. The
first Defendant goes on to say that he stopped within a foot
of the gravel edge - in fact he said his right wheels were
against the gravel edge. He said he could not go any further
to his right because the shoulder was soft and his vehicle
would have sunk into it. He said that at this point of time
he saw a light, which later turned out to be the lights of
the Plaintiff's vehicle, coming up behind him. If that were
the case it seems very likely that the Defendant too dipped
his lights to the car for which the Plaintiff dipped his lights.
The first Defendant says that, when he saw the light coming
up behind him he told his sideman to flag that vehicle down
because he thought it was the Company truck that he had unloaded
at Airport Camp. It is relevant here to state that the Defendant
was driving a crane which had been purchased from the British
Army and which had its steering wheel on the right; so that
the sideman would be seated towards the middle of the road.
The first Defendant goes on to say that before his sideman
could even get down he heard the squeal of tyres and the bang
as the Plaintiff's car ran into the rear of his crane. He
said that his lights cutting out and his pulling up, his speaking
to his sidemen and the Plaintiff running into him all happened
within about fifteen seconds. He said he had reflectors in
the crane to put out in such an event, but had no lights.
However, if he is telling the truth, that is academic because
he had no time to do anything. The vehicle does have a reflecting
sign saying 'Long Vehicle" affixed on its rear. The Plaintiff
says it was nine feet up on the back of the crane at the time
of the collision but had been lowered after the accident.
The first Defendant said it is riveted at a height of five
feet on the back of the crane. This was not contradicted -
that it was riveted. If it is riveted it could not have been
moved after the accident; this must mean that the Plaintiff
is mistaken about the height at which it was fixed and that
the reflecting sign was at the lower level all the time and
could have been seen by him. The Defendant says the gravel
edge was only a foot wide and not four to five feet as the
Plaintiff said. He agreed his right wheels were about eleven
feet from the left edge of the road inclusive of the soft
shoulder and gravelled area, and about two feet from the centre
of the road.
The road
according to the Plaintiff was 22 feet wide and according
to first Defendant 20 feet wide. The crane was about 8 feet
wide. If, as put to him in cross-examination and admitted
by him, the first Defendant had parked his vehicle two feet
from the centre, he would have been a foot from the edge of
the road even if Plaintiff's estimate is accepted. Another
method of double checking this seems to be to look at the
situation after the accident in relation to the position of
the two cars involved. The second car, which belonged to one
Luis Lu and which was coming from Belize City was still almost
wholly on the road and yet traffic was able to pass by after
the accident. This must mean the crane was at least a little
distance off the center of the road. I am satisfied that even
if the road is taken as being 22 feet wide, the crane was
within a foot or so of the edge of the paved road. In view
of the fact that he was seeking to park the vehic1e without
the assistance of any lights, I think the first Defendant
parked it as safely as he might without getting his vehicle
bogged down in the soft shoulder. He said it would have required
a crane to pull his vehicle out if he went on to the soft
shoulder. I do not think it unreasonable of him not to have
gone on to the soft shoulder in those circumstances. There
is one other matter I need mention on this aspect of the case
and that is that the Plaintiff admitted that measurements
had been taken of the position of the vehicles by the Police.
In view of the obvious relevance of the exact spot at which
the crane was parked it was essential for the Plaintiff's
case that the Plaintiff establish that it would parked, according
to his statement of claim, in a dangerous area and too much
into the road. On the evidence as it now stands I can only
hold that the crane was as far off the road as a reasonable
man would park it bearing in mind the soft shoulder and the
size and weight of the crane.
The Defendants
in their answers alleged that the Plaintiff was himself negligent
in that he drove too fast and that he failed to keep a proper
look out. The Plaintiff's admitted speed of 45 to 50 miles
per hour would not, of itself, be evidence of negligence if
it had been in good driving conditions much as daylight and
dry weather; in the dark and on a rainy night it would be
another matter altogether. The Plaintiff said he saw the "dark
object" when he was 110 feet from it. This appears to
be a reasonable estimate of the distance because his brake
mark or skid mark -it has been referred to as both - was 101
feet long. The Plaintiff himself said that he was too close
to it to stop with the assistance of his brakes. It is worth
repeating again here that there is no evidence to show that
the Plaintiff, when he dipped his lights to the oncoming car,
reduced speed even though he must obviously have been reducing
the limits of his vision. This was in all probability a major
contributory cause for his being unable to stop in time; he
was travelling at a speed at which he could only have stopped
in time if the obstruction was properly lit, thus adding to
the limits of his vision. A reflector, as the "Long Vehicle"
sign would only have shown up on the very extreme edge of
his dipped lights - and at the admitted speed of travel that
was again obviously too late. The Plaintiff had a straight
approach of a quarter mile and saw the crane when he was 110
feet from it when he was travelling at a speed at which he
could not by his own admission stop within the range of his
vision. This to my mind is negligence.
However,
the principal matter in issue is whether the first Defendant
was negligent in parking without lights. I have already found
that the position of his vehicle was not evidence of negligence
as it would be unreasonable to expect that on a straight half
mile stretch of road he should have taken the vehicle on to
the soft shoulder, or mud as the Plaintiff called it, and
got his vehicle bogged down.
"The
presence of an unlighted vehicle on a highway at night is
prima facie evidence of negligence and it is for the
driver to explain how he came to be unlighted and why he could
not move it out of the way or give warning to oncoming traffic"
in the words of Lord Justice Denning in the case of Hill
-Yenning v. Bezsant (1950). It is for the driver to take
reasonable steps to avoid creating or prolonging this hazard.
This principle was cited with approval and applied in the
case of Moore v. Maxwells of Ensworth Ltd. (1968).
The facts in that case were very similar to the present case.
It remains
for me to see whether the Defendants have rebutted the presumption
of negligence raised by the failure to have lights on the
parked vehicle. The first Defendant's evidence, which is uncontradicted
on this aspect, is that his lights were in good working condition
when he left the airport camp and that he had proceeded through
the dark with their assistance until at this place they failed
altogether when he dipped his lights for an oncoming vehicle.
The second Defendant, who has been in the engineering business
for thirty years, is the owner of heavy haulage equipment
including this crane. He says he has a regular inspection
schedule and that this vehicle was inspected within a month
before the accident and found to have everything in good working
order. The evidence thus establishes that the failure of the
lights was not due to any lack of proper maintenance, nor
to a failure on the part of the first Defendant to verify
they were working; because although he did not test them before
he started he did not have to do so because he started on
his journey with the lights on and working. The failure of
the lights, therefore, was not due to any negligence on the
part of the first or second Defendant.
The final
question that arises is whether the first Defendant was negligent
in not taking reasonable steps to warn other traffic of the
hazard. Again his evidence on this matter is uncontradicted.
His evidence is that when the lights cut out he pull out to
the edge of the paved area; this was challenged by the Plaintiff
but I have already dealt with the evidence on this aspect
and held that the physical facts make the first Defendant's
position far more probable than the Plaintiff's position that
the crane was 4 feet 6 inches from the paved edge of the road,
which would have put the 8 foot wide crane over the centre
of the road - a position not taken even by the Plaintiff.
The first Defendant saw the lights approaching behind him
and asked his sideman to stop that vehicle because he thought
it was the company truck. Before his sideman could even get
down - which was very fortunate for him - the collision occurred.
Whether he should have put up his reflectors first becomes
academic because there was in any event no time to do so before
the collision. Besides there was in any event a reflecting
sign saying "Long Vehicle" on the rear of the crane
and, as I have already found, at a height at which it could
be seen by a vehicle coming up behind it with its lights on.
There is, therefore, sufficient evidence to show that there
was no negligence on the part of the first or second Defendant,
and evidence instead of negligence on the part of the Plaintiff
in that he drove at a speed which was excessive in the circumstances
and thus made it impossible for him to avoid running into
the crane.
I dismiss
the Plaintiff's action with costs.
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