IN
THE MATTER |
of an application by Derek Aikman, Ramon Vasques and Mark
Vergo for leave to apply for an Order of Mandamus; |
|
AND |
IN
THE MATTER |
of the Representation of the People Ordinance 1978 |
Supreme
Court
Action No. 390 of 1983
22nd December, 1983
Moe, C. J.
Messrs.
H. Elrington, P. Goldson and Dean Barrow, for the Applicants.
Messrs. V.H. Courtenay S.C. and D. Courtenay S.C., for the
Respondent.
Order
for mandamus - Statutory interpretation - Election case
- Interpretation Ordinance (No. 18 of 1980) - The word "shall"
to be construed as imperative - The word "may"
to be construed as discretionary - Meaning of "as soon
as may be" - Representation of the People Registration
Rules - Whether right to inspect the binders of registration
record cards enables a taking/making of copies.
J
U D G M E N T
This is
an application for an Order for Mandamus commanding the Respondent,
Mr. Roy Young, the Chief Elections Officer to permit the Applicants
Derek Aikman, Ramon Vasques and Mark Vergo to inspect and
take copies of the records relating to the registration and
identification of voters kept by them in the form of binders.
The Applicants seek to have the Respondent comply with Rules
67 and 70 of the Representation of the People Registration
Rules 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the principal rules)
contained in Schedule II to the Representation of the People
Ordinance No. 2 of 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance).
It was
necessary to determine first what are the applicable rules.
The Applicants have relied on provisions contained in the
Representation of the People Registration (amendment) Rules
published as Statutory Instrument 73 of 1981, which purport
to amend the principal rules. The Respondent put before me
an Affidavit from the Clerk of the National Assembly, which
I accept, that the rules contained in Statutory Instrument
73 of 1981 were not laid before the National Assembly.
The Statutory
Instrument 73 of 1981 sets out that it was made by the Minister
of Home Affairs on the 28th August, 1981 by virtue of section
69 of the Ordinance. I therefore turn to sub-section (3) thereof
which provides "(3) Any rule made pursuant to this section
shall be laid before the National Assembly as soon
as it may be after the making thereof and if the Assembly
by resolution request that such rule be rescinded such rule
shall be rescinded by the Minister but without prejudice to
the validity of anything done thereunder."
Counsel
for the Applicants submitted that omission to lay the rules
as stated in section 69 (3) (supra) does not invalidate the
S.I. 73 of 1981. Reference was made to certain cases in which,
it was submitted, similar provisions were held to be directory
only.
Bayley
v. Williamson (1899) L.R. 8 Q.B. 118
Starey v. Graham (1899) 1 Q.B. 406
Springer v. Doorley (1950) L.R.B.G. 10
Jones v. Robison (1901) 1 K.B. 673
I think
it sufficient to hold that any principles of construction
enunciated in those cases are subject to the specific stipulations
of the Interpretation Ordinance of Belize No. 18 of 1980 the
Title of which tells us it is "An Ordinance to consolidate
and amend the law relating to the construction, application
and interpretation of laws ----- to define terms and expressions
in law and public documents -----". In section 2 (1)
it provides "Save where the contrary intention appears
either from the context of this Ordinance or any other Ordinance
or instrument, the provisions of this Ordinance shall
apply to this Ordinance and to any other Ordinance in force
whether such other Ordinance comes or came into operation
before or after the commencement of this Ordinance and to
any instruction made or issued by virtue of this Ordinance."
I am fortified
in this by the decision of the Supreme Court of Barbados in
Ronald Biggs v The Commissioner of Police Supreme Court
Action No. 16 of 1981. In that case the question arose
as to whether the failure to lay the Designated Commonwealth
Countries Extradition Order 1980 S.I. No. 74 of 1980 made
under the Extradition Act 1979, naming the U.K. as a country
to which persons could be extradicted, invalidated the Order.
At the time, it was sought to extradite Biggs from Barbados
pursuant to those provisions ten months after the Order had
been made. Chief Justice Sir William Douglas held inter
alia that while Springer v Doorley (supra) had
held that the affirmative laying requirement was directory
and Bayley v Williamson (supra) had held that the negative
laying requirement was directory, those cases were decided
in relation to interpretation provisions which differed from
the present interpretation Act of Barbados. Consequently any
principles laid down in those old cases must be read subject
to the specific provisions of the Interpretation Act of Barbados.
Section
59 of the Interpretation Ordinance of Belize provides as follows:
"In an enactment "shall" shall be construed
as imperative------". By virtue of this section and section
2 (supra), the Interpretation Ordinance has expressly laid
down that the requirement, in an ordinance or instrument which
it applies, that an instrument (such as is S.I. 73 of 1981)
shall be laid, is imperative. This duty to lay could only
be other than mandatory if there is a contrary intention in
the words of the respective ordinance or instrument. No such
contrary intention appears in section 69 (3) of the principal
rules nor the Ordinance.
The sections
69(3) further requires the duty to be performed "as soon
as may be." That expression is interpreted to mean "within
a reasonable time having regard to the care and dispatch with
which parliamentary business should be conducted." (See
again Biggs v Commissioner of Police (supra). I hold
that two years is not such a reasonable time.
Counsel
had also referred to section 21 (h) of the Interpretation
Ordinance which provides as follows: "Where an Ordinance
confers power on any authority to make subsidiary legislation
the following provisions shall, unless the contrary intention
appears have effect with reference to the making thereof-
"(h)
All such instruments shall be published in the Gazette
and shall, upon such publication or form such date as may
be mentioned therein, have the force of law". Counsel
submitted that the rules as set out in the Statutory Instrument
having been published in the Gazette have the force
of law and consequently failure to lay the rules does not
affect the validity of the Statutory Instrument. The submission
seems to mean that despite what may have been laid down
as preconditions for making a particular piece of subsidiary
legislation, even if those preconditions are not satisfied,
publication in the Gazette gives the instrument the
force of law. I cannot accept the submission. The section
21(h) does two things: (a) mandates publication of subsidiary
legislation and (b) stipulates the effective date of such
legislation. But this is clearly with reference to properly
made and valid subsidiary legislation. The sub-paragraph
has to be read along with other provisions of the Ordinance.
One such being for example section 21(b) which provides
that subsidiary legislation is not to be inconsistent with
the Ordinance under which it is made, and another is section
59.
I hold
that the requirement in section 69(3) that any rule made thereunder
shall be laid is imperative with the result that failure to
lay the Rules as contained in S.I. No. 73 of 1981 made under
Rule 69 (3) unvalidated the Statutory Instrument. I cannot
command the Chief Elections Officer to comply with provisions
which are not law and the application thus fails. That is
sufficient of the application thus fails. That is sufficient
to dispose of the application.
However
with great respect for the submissions made and anticipating
that the respective rules do become law I have deemed it worthwhile
to consider the matter on the basis that the rules are applicable.
They read as follows: Rule 67 "Where a document is made
available for inspection any person may make a copy
of, or take extracts from such document." Rule 70 (2)
"Any person who is authorized in writing by the Chairman
of any political party which is represented in the National
Assembly may, by prior arrangement with the Chief Elections
Officer, inspect the binders of registration record cards
maintained by the Chief Elections Officer in the presence
of the Chief Elections Officers or a person authorized by
him."
In this
case Mr. Dean Lindo, Chairman of the United Democratic party,
a party represented in the National Assembly issued a letter
appointing the Applicants and some other persons to inspect
the binders of registration record cards maintained at No.
38 Queen Street, Belize City. The Chief Elections Officer
made arrangement for the Applicants to inspect the binders
and to photograph the record cards in the presence of the
Assistant Records Officer. The Chief Elections Officer discovered
that a video camera was being used and that the Applicant
Mr. Aikman was dictating into a tape recorder, information
and particulars on the record cards. The Chief Elections Officer
refused to allow any further process as just mentioned. But
he has allowed inspection of the binders by two of the Applicants
in the presence of the Records Officer.
The Applicants
maintain that by a combination of Rules 67 and 70(2) the Respondent
is obliged to permit them to take copies of the records. They
contend firstly that Rule 70(2) confers a right on a person
duly authorized to examine the records at his option. The
right is subject only to the Chief Elections Officer's power
to make stipulations as to convenience for exercising the
right. Secondly by application of Rule 67, with the right
to examine goes the right to copy, which right includes the
right to copy by video camera.
The Respondents
contended that Rule 70 (2) is only an enabling provision and
that three conditions must be satisfied for the privilege
thereunder to be exercised. Secondly, that the privilege of
inspection provided for by Rule 70 (2) does not carry with
it any right to copy by virtue of Rule 67, which rule applies
to circumstances in which documents are made available for
inspection by the general public and not to circumstances
where documents are made available for inspection to a limited
class of persons as in the instant case.
By application
of section 59 of the Interpretation Ordinance (supra) the
use of the expression may in Rule 70(2) is directory. The
Rule 70(2) is therefore an enabling one. It enables or gives
power to persons authorized to inspect. The power to be exercised
under certain conditions namely: - (1) by prior arrangement
with the Chief Elections Officer and (2) in the presence of
the Chief Elections Officer or person authorized by him.
The Applicants
were persons authorized as provided by the rule; prior arrangement
for the exercise of their power under the rule was made with
the Chief Elections Officer and that the power would be exercised
in the presence of a person authorized by him.
The question
I then turn to is whether in the exercise of the power under
Rule 70(2) there is any power to take copies of the documents
concerned. As I understand the Applicants, since they rely
on Rule 67, their contention is that the provisions of Rule
70(2) having been satisfied and the binders of registration
cards having been made available for inspection, Rule 67 comes
into play and therefore the persons inspecting may make copies
or take extracts. It may seem pedantic to have to interpret
the expression "any person" appearing in Rule 67.
By giving the words their ordinary meaning, they clearly mean
anybody, any member of the public. Thus a construction of
the rules in the way for which the Applicants have contended
would amount to this, that the binders of records made available
for inspection by persons authorized may be copied by any
person i.e. any member of the public. That is clearly not
the purpose of Rule 67.
The meaning
of the words "any person" just indicated shows as
counsel for the Respondent has rightly argued, that Rule 67
applies where provisions is made for inspection of documents
by the world at large. Counsel referred to the Scheme of Rules
and pointed to Section 2 (3) of the Ordinance which provides
"where any register, notice, or other document is by
or under this Ordinance required to be published, it shall
be done, in the absence of any provision in this Ordinance
to the contrary by - (a) publishing it in the Gazette;
or (b) making copies thereof available for inspection at the
office of the Chief Elections Officer and that of the Registrar;
or (c) by affixing such register, notice or other document
to the Courthouse or Courthouses in the district to which
the register, notice, or other document relates, or such other
conspicuous place in that electoral division as the person
publishing considers necessary; (d) by advertising it in a
newspaper circulating in the area to which such register,
notice or other document relates, or by specifying in such
an advertisement the places at which such register, notice
or document is available for inspection; or (e) by placards
or handbills; or (f) by such other manner approved by the
Commission as the person publishing thinks is best calculated
to afford information to the persons who should receive such
information.
The section
sets out alternative ways of publishing a document i.e. giving
it to the world at large. One of those ways is "making
copies available at the office of the Chief Elections Officers
or Registrar." Thus in this interpretation section where
the Ordinance speaks of making documents available for inspection
it is speaking of documents required to be published i.e.
putting it to the world at large.
I hold
that by the Ordinance or Rules, binders of Registration cards
are not documents such as are required to be published or
in other words the contends of which are to be given to the
world at large and consequently Rule 67 does not apply to
them. On the basis that the Rules were in fact valid, the
Applicants claim to have the right to make copies of or take
extracts from binders of registration cards would still fail.
Application
is according refused and the Respondent is to have his costs
fit for two counsel.
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