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(DAVID
GABB |
APPELLANT |
BETWEEN |
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(THE
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RESPONDENT
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Court
of Appeal
Criminal Appeal No. 1 of 1982
5th March, 1982
SIR JAMES SMITH, P.
A.L.STAINE, J.A.
H.L. da Costa, J.A.
Appeal
from conviction and sentence of 3 years imposed for burglary
- Section 200 of Criminal Code - intent required for 1st
count of burglary - intent to commit rape - no evidence
led by Prosecution to support such intent - burden of proof
not discharged - conviction unsupported by evidence - appeal
allowed - conviction quashed - sentence set aside.
J U D G M E N T
This is
an appeal against conviction and sentence. The Appellant was
charged on an indictment containing two counts, both for burglary.
The second count was in the alternative. In the first count
the accused was charged with burglary contrary to section
200 of the Criminal Code, Ch. 21. The particulars of the offence
were that on the 26th June, 1981, the Appellant at Belize
City in the Central District of the Supreme Court, did by
night, unlawfully break a building, to wit: the dwelling house
of Geraldine Cadle situated at No. 110 New Road, with intent
to commit a felony therein to wit: Rape.
The second
Count, in the alternative, was identical save that in this
count the intent alleged was to commit the felony of theft
in the dwelling house.
The Appellant
was tried before a jury on 27th January, 1982. The evidence
for the Crown so far as material shows that around 2 a. m.
on the 26th June the Appellant broke and entered the dwelling?house
of one Geraldine Cadle. She was lying in bed but not asleep.
She heard a male voice outside saying "O.K. Elaine"
and then a female voice saying "Why don't you go leave
me alone". She at first thought it was her husband. Then
she tilted the blinds to look and saw a man with a clear shirt
coming upstairs. He came on to the verandah but did not knock
on any of the doors. She heard a sash window shaking and went
to a crack in her room to look into the parlour, but she could
not see anything as the curtain was down. After a while she
heard footsteps coming back around the verandah. She peeped
underneath the floor. The person then turned back and went
to a window. She went back to the crack in the wall, looked
and saw the person lowering himself through the sash window
into the parlour from the verandah. There was a bright light
in the parlour; she recognized the man whom she knew before.
The intruder
went straight towards the room door of Geraldine's grandmother.
Geraldine then screamed - "Thief". The man quickly
retraced his steps and stood in the middle of the parlour.
At this stage Geraldine called out to her absent husband "Eric
wake up, there is a man in the house". The grandmother
who had emerged from her room also started to shout "Thief".
The intruder then beat a hasty retreat through the sash window
by which he had entered.
The Appellant
was found guilty on the first count and was sentenced to three
years imprisonment. From this conviction and sentence the
Appellant has appealed on the ground that the verdict of the
jury was unreasonable and against the weight of evidence.
Admittedly
the intruder was a trespasser and had clearly committed a
summary offence. But the burden of proof was on the Crown
to establish that the Appellant had the intent to commit rape
? a necessary ingredient of the offence charged.
The learned
trial judge directed the jury that unless they were satisfied
on the evidence that the Appellant went in for the express
purpose or committing either felony they should acquit. So,
too if they were left in doubt. But at no stage did he direct
their attention to any evidence which showed an intention
to commit the offence of rape: and this for a very good reason.
Any such evidence was conspicuous by its absence.
Counsel
for the Crown made a valiant attempt to support the conviction.
He was ever driven to submit that an expression of a desire
for female companionship on the part on the Appellant would
show the necessary intent; as if a desire for an apple would
constitute an intent to raid an orchard.
From the
evidence it is clear that the Appellant retreated with celerity
the moment he was duped into thinking there was a man in the
house. As Talbot C.J. once observed: "The thought of
man is not triable, for the devil himself knoweth not the
thought of man". Whatever thought might have been in
the mind of the Appellant he fled the scene before giving
the slightest indication of what he intended. Certainly there
was no evidence to show he had any intention to commit the
felony of rape. In the circumstances the conviction plainly
cannot be supported.
Accordingly
the appeal is allowed, the conviction quashed and the sentence
set aside.
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