Supreme Court
Action No. 77 of 1998
30th September, 1990
G. D. Meerabux, J.

Mr. K. Anderson and Mrs. Antoinette Moore in person.
Mr. Kennedy Gentle and Mr. Damian Cayetano in person.

Attorney - Whether retained for professional service - Payment of reasonable fees on a 'quantum merit' basis for professional services rendered.

J U D G M E N T

The plaintiffs' claim is for damages for $7,000.00 ($3,500.00 per defendant) to be assessed on a 'quantum merit' basis for the legal services rendered by the Plaintiffs to the defendants to date.

It is not in dispute that both Plaintiffs are attorneys-at-law and that both defendants were Police Officers - the first-named defendant was a Corporal with approximately eight years of service and the second-named defendant approximately two years of service,

PLAINTIFFS' TESTIMONY

The testimony of the second-named plaintiff may be summarised as follows: The two defendants and Hubert Lucas were Police Officers who were acquitted in November 1996 in a criminal trial in the Southern District Criminal Sessions. Their attorneys at the trial were the second-named plaintiff and Mr. Simeon Sampson S.C. On the defendants return to work they were placed on interdiction and were informed that an internal tribunal will be conducted to see if they had violated any of the Rules within the Police Force or behaved in a manner unbecoming of a Police Officer.

In March 1997, they retained the second-named defendant to represent them before the Police Tribunal and promised orally that each of them would pay whatever reasonable legal fees she assessed at the conclusion of the hearing.

She carried out some legal research and filed a Constitutional Motion on the 21st April, 1997, which was adjourned sine die on the 29th April, 1997. In respect of this Motion both defendants swore to affidavits which she prepared and they paid $280.00 and $70.00 respectively.

The Rules and Regulations of the Police Force prevented her from personally appearing before the Police Tribunal but she regularly, personally and by telephone, instructed Inspector Rodriguez who represented the defendants before the Tribunal and monitored the proceedings. Subsequently Inspector Rodriguez was involved in a traffic accident and was unable to continue representing the defendants but she continued to make representations on their behalf to the Commissioner of Police and ASP Nicholas to have the matter adjourned pending the return of Inspector Rodriguez without success. The Tribunal proceeded and both defendants were dismissed from the Police Force.

She filed an Appeal in August 1997, on behalf of first-named defendant who was in contact with her against the Tribunal's decision but not on behalf on the second-named defendant with whom she lost contact. Subsequently, the first-named defendant visited her and told her that the first-named plaintiff was now working on the matter to seek reinstatement of the defendants in the Police Force. She then spoke to the first-named plaintiff, and to the first-named defendant asking him to contact the second-named defendant to make sure that the defendants wish to retain two attorneys and explained that both attorney s would have to be paid at the conclusion of the case to which the first-named defendant said "No problem, don't worry". Thereafter she and the first-named plaintiff jointly represented the defendants in seeking their reinstatement in the Police Force making several phone calls, drafting a letter to Solicitor General seeking a resolution of the matter as the Belize Advisory Council was not moving quickly. The first-named defendant in attempting to bring this matter to a conclusion was willing to resign or retire from the Police Force if permitted, and in or around July or August 1998, he received communication that he would be retired and his dismissal rescinded based on a recommendation from the Solicitor General. She was happy and sent letters to the two defendants asking them to sign an authorization to deduct the legal fees from their outstanding wages. The first-named defendant agreed but changed his mind assuring her that he will pay the legal fees. The legal fees of $1,750.00 is still outstanding against each of the defendants.

Under cross-examination by the first-named defendant she maintained that by the oral agreement made with her, she would assess her fees based on the time and work she had expended in representing the defendants. She admitted that they agreed $500.00 each for her expenses in filing the Constitutional Motion which has not been heard and he only paid her $280.00 towards that amount. She made many phone calls on behalf of the defendants and the first-named defendant visited her office about nine times.

Under cross-examination by the second-named defendant she maintained that she had many discussions with the first-named plaintiff on this matter and denied that he told her that the second-named defendant only wanted one attorney to represent him.

The first-named plaintiff's testimony may be summarised as follows: In late 1997 or early 1998, the two defendants and Mr. Hubert Lucas requested him to represent them in regard to their dismissals from their respective posts as Police Officers. They also told him that they were represented by the second-named plaintiff and would wish him to represent them along with her in regard to their reinstatement or to obtain some measure of compensation arising from their dismissal and were prepared to pay whatever reasonable fee he would charge them for his time and effort. He researched the matter and in March 1998, he submitted to the Secretary of the Belize Advisory Council correspondence on their behalf. In representing the defendants he had discussions with the second-named plaintiff and was satisfied when he learnt that the defendants would receive all benefits to which they were entitled. He contacted the first-named defendant who promised to pay his legal fees but who stated he had difficulty in paying the second-named plaintiff whom he felt had not done much work for him.

He sent his invoices to each of the defendants for $1,750.00 for services rendered but only Mr. Lucas paid his bill. The two defendants have not paid their bills.

Under cross-examination by the first-named defendant he admitted that he was told that the fees were too high; and he could not afford it that the second-named plaintiff had done much of the work; maintains that he informed the defendants of his researches and letters to the Advisory Council, but admits that the matter is no longer before that body as a result of the Solicitor General's advise. He tried without success to get in touch with the first-named defendant to inform him of the result and was of the view that the first-named defendant was avoiding him and was never told that they were not satisfied with his work. He believes that the fees charged were fair.

Cross-examined by the second-named defendant he said he don't recall indicating a reasonable fee or what sum he was able to obtain for the defendants and can't recall the second-named defendant stating that he wish him to represent him totally and tried unsuccessfully to get in touch with him.

THE DEFENDANTS' TESTIMONY

The first-named defendant admitted in his testimony that he owes both plaintiffs money for legal services rendered expressing his gratitude to both of them especially the second-named plaintiff but claims that they were asking too much and he can't afford to pay their claim. The second-named plaintiff had agreed a fee of $500.00 to represent him in the entire matter before the Belize Advisory Council and if need be in the Supreme Court and before the internal Tribunal. The second-named defendant and a Mr. Lucas were witnesses to this agreement. He admitted he held discussions with the first-named plaintiff who agreed to take the matter to the Supreme Court and to charge a reasonable fee but not to the Belize Advisory Council since the second-named plaintiff had already done that. The matter was not concluded in the Supreme Court or the Belize Advisory Council but he obtained the benefits on his own efforts and that of the area representative Hon. Dito Juan.

Cross-examined by the first-named plaintiff he maintains that -

(1) He received help from Mr. Dito Juan in recovering his gratuity of about $10,000.00 plus in 1998, after the General Elections and that he agreed to pay to the second-named plaintiff $500.00 for taking matters before the Supreme Court and the Belize Advisory Council.

(2) He agreed to pay fees but the amount was not settled and $1,700 was too high.

(3) He admits that he was aware of a matter before the Belize Advisory Council but did not know that both plaintiffs worked on the matter.

(4) He believed the first-named plaintiff did not do what he asked him to do which was to take the matter to the Supreme Court so that he could get back his job and his benefits and that when he saw the first-named plaintiff the matter was already lodged in the Supreme Court.

(5) He believed the second-named plaintiff assisted him in getting his gratuity but that the first-named plaintiff did nothing for him.

Cross-examined by the second-named plaintiff he admitted that he visited her office in March 1997, concerning his dismissal by the Belize Police Force, and agreed to take the matter to the Supreme Court. He recognized a copy of the Constitutional Motion and his signature on the accompanying affidavit. He admitted that five letters shown to him addressed to the Commissioner of Police, Registrar General, ASP Nicholas (2 letters) and to Mr. McKoy Faculty of Law, Jamaica were written on his behalf which were written prior to the first-named plaintiff being retained in this case. He admitted visiting her office from time to time to discuss Inspector Rodriguez's absence and to suspend the Tribunal Inquiry until Rodriguez recovery, He admitted that on 6th August, 1997, he was informed verbally of his dismissal from the Police Force, wished to appeal to the, Belize Advisory Council within 21 days and was shown letters written to the said Advisory Council and to ASP Nicholas on his behalf. He denied discussing specific fees or promise to pay when the matter was concluded. He admitted Mr. Anderson was retained but denied being told that he had to pay both lawyers. He admitted paying Mrs. Moore $280.00. His understanding was that Mr. Anderson would take the matter to the Supreme Court and Mrs. Moore would deal with the Belize Advisory Council. He admitted saying that he would be satisfied in obtaining his gratuity and getting on with his life and understood that the Constitutional Motion was to get his job back. He admitted that he followed Mrs. Moore's advise to seek redress before the Belize Advisory Council and was also pursuing the Constitutional Motion. He admits he received some benefits and if no action was taken he would have lost all benefits.

The second-named defendant's testimony may be summarised as follows: He admits that sometime in 1997, he and the first-named defendant and Hubert Lucas visited the second-named plaintiff and sought her assistance in a matter before the Police Tribunal who charged him a fee of $500.00 which he agreed to and paid $70.00 on account.

He admitted some months later that he, the first named defendant and Mr. Lucas, visited the first-named plaintiff seeking his assistance who advised them that he would file a Constitutional Motion and told them that he would charge a reasonable fee for the money received. He had personally written to the Belize Advisory Council and was later told by the first-named plaintiff that the Belize Advisory Council had ruled in his favour. He later went to the Prime Minister's office who assisted him to procure his benefits.

Under cross-examination by the second-named plaintiff he admitted that he hired her for professional legal services and never fired nor released her from such professional services.

Under cross-examination by the first-named plaintiff he admitted that he hired him for professional services after he was dismissed, but found out that he had done nothing for him before the Belize Advisory Council. He personally worked very hard in fighting for his benefits and found no time to inform the first-named plaintiff that he no longer required his professional services. He was not aware that the second-named plaintiff was working on his benefits, was surprised to learn that a letter was written to the Belize Advisory Council on his behalf and admitted that this plaintiff could not get in touch with him because he had changed his address. He admitted he received benefits and back pay totalling $10,600.00, that he agreed to pay a reasonable fee on what he received but denied that the plaintiffs played any part in retrieving his benefits - he did it on his own with the assistance of the Prime Minister. He admitted paying the second-named plaintiff $70.00 on account and told the first-named plaintiff that he was not willing to pay two lawyers to represent him. He admitted that the first-named plaintiff was the only person who assisted him in obtaining his benefits and agreed to pay the second-named plaintiff only $500.00 for the work she had done, but had terminated her services although he did not do so personally. He felt it sufficient in telling the first-named plaintiff that he wanted him to do whatever was necessary to represent him on this matter.

THE FIRST ISSUE I HAVE TO DECIDE IS WHETHER THE PLAINTIFFS WERE RETAINED BY THE DEFENDANTS FOR LEGAL SERVICES IN REGARD TO THEIR DISMISSAL FROM THE POLICE FORCE

I find that there is overwhelming evidence that both defendants engaged the services of both plaintiffs to represent them before an internal Police Tribunal seeking their reinstatement and or obtaining their financial entitlements. In fact, I find that both defendants have admitted seeking professional legal services from the plaintiffs.

THE SECOND ISSUE I HAVE TO DECIDE IS WHAT FEES WERE AGREED BETWEEN THE PARTIES FOR THE SAID PROFESSIONAL LEGAL SERVICES

The plaintiffs' claim is for $7,000.00 ($3,500.00 per defendant) assessed on a quantum merit basis for their legal services rendered to the defendants. As I understand the defendants testimony, the first-named defendant while admitting he owes both plaintiffs for their legal services alleges that the claims are too high for such services since he obtained his financial benfits by his own efforts with the assistance of his area representative Mr. Dito Juan. Whereas the second-named defendant admitted that he sought legal assistance in the said matter from the second-named plaintiff for an agreed fee of $500.00 and subsequently visited the first-named plaintiff who agreed to charge a reasonable fee but the Belize Advisory Council ruled in his favour and he obtained benefits through his own efforts and the assistance of the Prime Minister.

I find that both defendants have failed to disclose to the Court what efforts they made on their own behalf to have the Belize Advisory Council rule in their favour and to obtain their financial benefits nor has the Court heard from Mr. Dito Juan or the Prime Minister of their efforts in this regard.

On the other hand this Court has before it the following exhibits:

(1) Letter dated 11th March 1997, to the Commissioner of Police on behalf of the two defendants by the second-named plaintiff

(2) Letter dated 12th March 1997, to Registrar General on behalf of the two defendants by the second-named plaintiff

(3) Letter dated 14th March 1997, to ASP Nicholas on behalf of the two defendants by the second-named plaintiff

(4) Letter dated 21st March 1997, to Mr. Derrick McKoy, U.Wl. Kingston, Jamaica on behalf of the two defendants by the second-named plaintiff

(5) Letter dated 22nd May, 1997, to ASP Nicholas on behalf of the two defendants by the second-named plaintiff

(6) Fax dated 15th September, 1997, to Ms. Shirley McSweaney of the Belize Advisory Council on behalf of the two defendants by the second-named plaintiff

(7) Fax dated 6th August, 1997, to Mr. Ellis Arnold, Chairman of the Belize Advisory Council on behalf of the two defendants by the second-named plaintiff

(8) Fax dated 6th August, 1997, to Mr. Edwin Flowers, Chairman of the Belize Advisory Council on behalf of the two defendants by the second-named plaintiff

(9) Fax dated 15th September, 1997, to second-named defendant from Ms. McSweaney, secretary of the Belize Advisory Council by the second-named plaintiff

(10) Letter dated 17th September, 1997, to ASP Nicholas on behalf of the two defendants by the second-named plaintiff.

In addition I have before me -

(a) Notice of Motion for Constitutional Redress filed on behalf of the two defendants with supporting affidavits sworn to by the two defendants with Exhibits A, B, C, D, E and F, prepared by the second-named plaintiff

(b) Submissions in writing dated 5th March, 1998, to the Belize Advisor council by the first-named plaintiff

(c) Letter dated 26th March, 1999, from Secretary, Belize Advisory Council to the first-named plaintiff

(d) Letter dated 15th April, 1998, from first-named plaintiff to Belize Advisory Council containing case materials in support of his submissions which indicates that a Petition was prepared and forwarded to the Belize Advisory Council on behalf of the defendants.

I find that quite apart from these revealing Exhibits which indicated an enormous amount of hours of work, effort and research carried out by the plaintiffs in filing the Constitutional Motions and Petition to the Advisory Council, one has to consider the many conferences, telephone calls by both plaintiffs and trips from Dangriga to Belize City by the second-named plaintiff in carrying out her professional services to the defendants and her appearance in the Supreme Court in Belize City in respect of the Constitutional Motion.

I further find that it was the combined legal advise and effort carried out by the plaintiffs which resulted in the defendants obtaining certain financial benefits to which they were entitled. I can find no other rational explanation for the defendants being allowed to retire from the Police Force and obtaining accrued financial benefits.

I find that the Attorneys'-at-Law (Remuneration for Non-Contentious Business) Rules, 1993, fixes hourly fees for attorneys under five years standing as $100.00 and over five years at $200.00 with journeys in Belize one and half times the normal hourly fee.

I believe and accept the evidence of the plaintiffs that they had agreed with the defendants to charge a reasonable fee for their professional services.

I find that the first and second-named plaintiffs expended more than 15 and 30 hours of work respectively in carrying out their professional services on behalf of the defendants and that the fees claimed are reasonable and in conformity with the said Rules.

I further find it incredulous that the second-named plaintiff had agreed on a fee of $500.00 for such professional services.

I further find the behaviour of both defendants to be deplorable in that they sought the professional services of the plaintiffs in their hour of great need, promised to pay for such professional services, and having obtained certain financial benefits as a result of such professional services have refused to pay. This is unacceptable behaviour.

For the above reasons I give judgment for the plaintiffs for the sum of $7,000.00 ($3,500.00 against each defendant) with costs to be agreed or taxed.

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