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(ROBERT
HOTCHANDANI |
PLAINTIFF |
BETWEEN |
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(AND
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(ALFRED
MEHLADO |
DEFENDANT |
Supreme
Court
Action No. 134 of 1981
27th January, 1983.
Rajasingham, J.
Mr. Glenn
Godfrey, for the Plaintiff.
Mr. M. C. Turton, for the Defendant.
Trespass
- Defendant entering his own premises which were leased
to Plaintiff - Defendant causing damage to premises in the
course of entering - Whether Defendant guilty of trespassing
upon his own premises occupied by Plaintiff under a lease
agreement.
Lease Agreement - Oral lease agreement - Plaintiff expending
money to effect repairs to Defendant's premises on the basis
of an oral lease agreement - Defendant denying ever entering
into an oral lease agreement with Plaintiff - Whether the
fact that Plaintiff expended money to effect repairs to
Defendant's premises supportive of existence of oral lease
agreement.
J
U D G M E N T
This is
an Action filed by the Plaintiff applying for an injunction
to stop the Defendant and his servants and agents from trespassing
on the Plaintiff's shop premises, and for damages for trespass.
The Defendant, while admitting he broke into the premises,
denies that he was trespassing, because the Plaintiff's lease
had expired. The Defendant also counterclaims for possession
of the premises and mesne profits.
The evidence
in this case is brief. The Plaintiff gave evidence and, while
he appeared to have a poor memory for dates, stated in essence
that the premises in suit were leased to Hans Bhojwani, his
brother-in-law, in 1975. In 1975, at the request of Hans Bhojwani,
the lease of the premises was transferred to Devi Hotchandani,
Plaintiff's mother. That lease was for a period of three years
from the 18th February, 1972, in the first instance, with
an option to renew it for a further period of three years.
It was accordingly renewed in 1978, but this time in favour
of the Plaintiff. Thus far, the Plaintiff and Defendant are
agreed on the facts. The Plaintiff says that in October, 1980,
he met the Defendant in the shop known as Manhattan Store
and there asked him for a renewal of the lease for a further
three years at an increased rental of $7,200 per annum; the
rent at the time was $6,000 per annum and had during the first
three years been $4,800 per annum. The Plaintiff says the
Defendant agreed to lease the premises for a further three
years and they also spoke of repairs which the Plaintiff was
going to do and which were roughly estimated as costing in
the region of $6,000 to $8,000. The Plaintiff, thereafter,
proceeded to spend the sum of $6,000 on repairs to the Defendant's
property. In his original defence the Defendant answered that
he did not at any time consent to or approve of the Plaintiff
spending sums in excess of $6,000.00 and denied that he was
at any time "before or after the expiration of the lease
aware of any renovation of the premises nor was such renovation
as alleged ever brought to his attention". In his amended
answer he denied the allegation made in the plaint in more
general terms. However, in evidence he said, "I was not
aware until recently that Hotchandani had done repairs to
the shop". Thus he admits in effect that he is now aware
that repairs were in fact done, although he may have become
aware of it after his first answer was filed. I accept the
evidence of the Plaintiff on this point, namely that he did
spend over $6,000.00 on repairs to the Defendant's premises.
The Plaintiff
goes on to talk of his having received a letter dated 19th
January, 1981, from solicitor, Mr. Turton, asking him to vacate
these premises by 1st February, 1981. He said he took the
matter to his solicitor, Mr. Godfrey. The Plaintiff then said
he cannot recall receiving a letter dated 22nd January, 1981
from Mr. Turton. On being shown the letter, he said he was
positive he had not received such letter. He also said he
did not receive the original of the letter dated March 24th,
1981 from Mr. Turton. Both these letters are addressed to
Mr. Bob Hotchandani, c/o The City Centre Store, Belize City.
The Plaintiff's Counsel had in fact filed an Affidavit signed
by the Plaintiff in which these two letters are declared as
being in the Plaintiff's possession. The Plaintiff could thus
have no motive for falsely denying he received them. I can
only surmise that he either just handed them over on receipt
to his solicitor and forgot about them, or someone in his
shop did so and he in fact never actually saw them.
The Plaintiff
certainly did not appear to be a fool. The Plaintiff does
not appear to have ever replied to these letters of 19th and
22nd January, 1981, but his solicitor replied to the letter
of March, 1981. Mr. Turton's letter of 22nd January, 1981,
states that the Plaintiff's "request to re-lease the
premises" was conveyed to the Defendant and the Defendant
is not agreeable. The Plaintiff says he spoke to Mr. Turton
and asked him for a further lease because of the Defendant's
oral agreement. Since the "re-lease" referred to
in Mr. Turton's letter could be a request for a written agreement,
it does not contradict the Plaintiff with sufficient certainty
to throw any substantial doubt on his evidence on his point.
The Plaintiff
then speaks of the occurrence of civil disturbances in March/April,
1981, and of the ransacking of his shop. He said he lost about
seventy-five percent of his stock. He said that when finally
he was allowed to do so, he instructed a carpenter to board
up the broken windows and doors, but found someone had beaten
him to it. He said he then removed the locks and began removing
old stock and restocking his shop. After he had been doing
this for a day or two he came to the shop to find that someone
had removed part of the zinc roofing and that four fans were
missing. He said the fluorescent lamps on the roof had fallen.
He reported the matter to the Police. He later learnt that
the Defendant was responsible and this led to his filing this
Action.
The Defendant
gave evidence and denied any oral agreement in October, 1980.
He said he instructed his lawyer to send a demand to the Plaintiff
to vacate the premises on the due date. He agreed with Plaintiff's
Counsel's suggestion that he did this because he had changed
his mind, and then denied there had been any change of mind.
He says he decided to evict the Plaintiff because these Indians
were burning shops and when asked to elucidate mentioned the
burning of his shop by a Mr. Bhojwani. He did, therefore,
finally agree with a suggestion, at first denied by him, that
it was fear of fire that led him to seek to evict the Plaintiff.
It is not clear when this fear was born in his mind. The Plaintiff
suggests that it was after October, 1980.
The Defendant
admits he broke into the premises in issue in April 1981,
by breaking down the rear door. He said he did so in the belief
that the lease having expired, he was entitled to do so and
also because he thought the premises had been abandoned. This
is totally unacceptable for several reasons. If, in fact,
he thought the premises were abandoned, he could very easily
have obtained the key to it - instead he chose to cause damage
to his own premises by breaking in a door. He then removed
roofing sheets, hardboard and light fixtures, according to
his first answer, and zinc sheets and some electric wiring,
according to his evidence and his second answer. The removal
of the zinc sheets and leaving them off overnight - because
the Plaintiff discovered them when he opened the store - while
the Plaintiff's goods were still in the shop, as stated by
Plaintiff and not denied by Defendant, was clearly a malicious
act by the Defendant and not one done in furtherance of repairs.
It clearly shows that the Defendant knew, when he did it,
that the Plaintiff was still in occupation of the shop. The
only interpretation one can give to such an act in these circumstances
is that the Defendant, knowing he had no legal recourse or
not knowing he had, decided to take matters into his own hands;
and this in turn tends to give support to the Plaintiff's
claim that the Defendant had agreed orally to lease the premises
to him for a further period of three years from February,
1981, and that that was why he expended such a large sum on
the renovation of the shop in October, 1980. Accordingly,
I find that the Defendant did agree orally to lease the premises
at 5 Albert Street or Market Square to the Plaintiff for a
period of three years from the 1st of February, 1981, at a
rental of $7,200.00 per annum. In view of the admissions made
by the Defendant, I have no difficulty in also arriving at
a finding that the Defendant did cause damage to the premises
while it was in the occupation of the Plaintiff and that the
Plaintiff expended a sum of $600 in repairing the said damage.
In so entering and causing damage to the premises, the Defendant
is guilty of trespass. As there is no evidence of any explicit
damage suffered by the Plaintiff, I award a sum of $500 as
damages for the said trespass and the inconvenience caused
by it. The Plaintiff will, of course, be liable to pay the
agreed rental of $7,200.00 per annum for the lease period.
I award
the Plaintiff the sum of $600 as damages for the cost of repairs
borne by him, a sum of $500 as damages for trespass and the
costs of this Action. I also grant the Plaintiff an injunction
restraining the Defendant, his servants or agents from trespassing
on the said premises at 5 Albert Street or Market Square for
so long as the Plaintiff is lawfully in occupation thereof.
I dismiss
the Defendant's counterclaim with costs.
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