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(GUERMO JONCH
(
PLAINTIFF
BETWEEN (AND
(
(MARCELINO RODRIGUEZ DEFENDANT

Supreme Court
Action No. 296 of 1981
9th December, 1983.
Rajasingham, J.

Messrs. Pitts & Elrington for the Plaintiff.
W.H. Courtenay & Co. for the Defendant.

Traffic accident resulting in loss of sight by Plaintiff - Accident due to the negligence of the Defendant - Assessment of general damages - Principles to be applied by the Court in assessing general damages for loss of sight resulting from the accident.

J U D G M E N T

The Plaintiff's Action is for damages arising from an accident caused by the negligence of the Defendant. The Defendant, while admitting his negligence, denies that the Plaintiff suffered any or all of the damages set out in his Statement of Claim.

The Plaintiff gave evidence on the question of damages, stating that he was hit on the left shoulder, head, left hip and foot by the Defendant's car. He said he had pain all over and that his right eye was red and painful. He said he covered his left eye and realized he had lost his sight in his right eye. He said he could see up to 50 yards without his spectacles before the accident.

The Plaintiff said his cart was smashed, but that the Defendant bore the whole cost of the repairs. He said the Defendant also paid for new spectacles as his spectacles were also damaged in the accident.

He said the Defendant paid him $350 for loss of earnings. He said this was in respect of "days lost". He went on to say that he tried to reach an agreement, meaning an agreement on the rest of his claim, but that the Defendant refused. He said he could still work and that he had no hobbies such as sports or reading.

The Plaintiff called two doctors as witnesses and they inter alia made it clear that the Plaintiff was not a truthful witness. Dr. Garcia, who examined him after the accident, saw no bruising or bleeding or any abnormality about the Plaintiff's right eye. He said the Plaintiff only complained of a headache and pain all over the body. The Plaintiff sought to add to his pleadings a claim for a fractured foot, and Dr. Garcia categorically said that the Plaintiff had suffered no fracture, only bruising. The document "TB1" produced by the Plaintiff talks of an elastic bandage on the Plaintiff's left ankle on the day after the accident and says he was in satisfactory condition when discharged on the 2nd of November, l980. Dr. Hegar, the eye specialist, saw the Plaintiff on the 18th of December, l980. He said the Plaintiff could only see light in the right eye at that date. He said he had cerebral haemorrhaging and breaks in the choroid. He saw him again on the 29th of January, l981 and said the haemorrhaging was resolving at that date. Dr. Hegar saw the Plaintiff again in March, 1981 and on that date found indications of trauma in the right eye. Dr. Hegar says the damage to the right eye was probably due to the history reported - meaning the accident. He stated that these problems could arise from an impact to the head and in re-examination he said he found no other cause for the haemorrhaging. By March 1981, the Plaintiff had lost all sight in his right eye.

I am satisfied that Dr. Hegar's evidence read with Dr. Garcia's statement that the Plaintiff's principal complaint was of a headache, clearly proves that the Plaintiff suffered this damage to the right eye as a result of a blow to the head received at the time of the accident. There is no evidence to suggest, as Counsel submitted, that the injury was caused by a subsequent fall or accident.

The Plaintiff's evidence is that he spent eight days in the hospital, but the record shows (TBl) that it was in fact six days. By the Plaintiff's own evidence he accepted $350 as compensation for that period, whether it be two months or less, during which he was prevented from carrying on his occupation. Although he accepted this sum in 1981, I do not think he accepted it as anything more than a loss of earnings. I, therefore, disallow his claim for additional loss of earnings.

I come now to the question of general damages. The evidence of Dr. Hegar is that the Plaintiff had myopia and that the degeneration was the same in both eyes. He said he would venture an opinion that at the time of the accident in October, 1980, the Plaintiff was equally myopic in both eyes. He said the myopia in the left eye had reduced the Plaintiff's vision to 20/200 and that that eye was probably in the same condition in October, 1980, the date of the accident. Dr. Hegar said that the person with 20/200 sight was in the United States, considered to be legally blind. He said 20/20 was normal vision.

Following the criteria so well elucidated by Wooding C.J. in Cornelliac v St. Louis, my findings are as follows: -

(1) the injury was a blow to the head and body;

(2) the physical disability that resulted was complete blindness of the right eye which had, prior to the accident, had 20/200, or about 10% of normal vision;

(3) the Plaintiff suffered headaches and pain all over the body for some four months in the case of the headaches and perhaps the six days spent in hospital in the case of the other body pains;

(4) he has suffered the loss of 10% of his sight in one eye, and although Dr. Hegar said there would be deterioration in any event from myopia, he certainly suffered acceleration of the degeneration due to the haemorrhaging.

It remains for me to assess the general damages. In placing his loss of sight at 10%, I have followed the criteria applied in the cases of Gateson v Kiln Park Estates (per Griffith T.) and Smith v Ford Motor Co. (per Crichton T.) In those cases the prior disability was taken into account in assessing the degree of actual loss of amenities suffered; both were cases dealing with loss of sight. I think it is most relevant that pre-existing disability should be taken into account, as to do otherwise would be to compensate the claimant for far more than the amenities lost. The Plaintiff lost 10 per cent of normal vision in one eye. There is no evidence of any loss of amenities.

It remains for me to estimate the loss suffered by the Plaintiff and in doing so I take such guidance as I can from awards made elsewhere, making such adjustments as are appropriate to conditions in Belize.

In the case of Vickerman v Parker decided in July 1982 by Cantley J., the learned judge noted per curiam that the "current conventional award for the loss of an eye was £10,000". This is borne out by such cases as Gateson v Kiln Park Estates (1980) where a sum of $8,000 was awarded to a boy of 13 after an agreed discount of 25 per cent for a pre-existing abnormality; and Vandome v Jones (1979) where £10,000 was awarded to a girl aged two years for the loss of sight in one eye.

The Plaintiff's age is not in evidence, but he appeared to be a young man in his twenties or early thirties. Hence, unlike in Vickerman v Parker where the sum was reduced to £8,000 because the Plaintiff was 60 years of age, no reduction needs to be made on grounds of age.

Taking into account the pain and suffering suffered by the Plaintiff and bearing in mind that he does not suffer any continuing pain or discomfort other than such inconvenience as may be caused by limited vision, I award a sum of $3,500 as general damages. The Plaintiff will be entitled to the costs of his action less the costs awarded to the Defendant on the 7th of November, 1983.


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