Supreme Court
Action No. 319 of 1982
7th January, 1983.
Rajasingham, J.

Lease Agreement - Lease Agreement not executed by parties -Whether relationship of parties governed by common law or by Section 7 of the Landlord and Tenant Ordinance or by both.

J U D G M E N T

The plaintiff who is owner of the premises No. 41 Albert Street, Belize City, seeks to eject the defendant Hansraj Bhojwani from the portion of the said premises leased by the plaintiff to the defendant under a written agreement dated 20th June, 1977. This agreement, which was not actually ever executed, provided for an initial term of three years at a rental of $650.00 a month and a further term of two years at a rental of $700.00 per month. It also purported to provide for an option to renew the said agreement for a further period of five years upon a rent to be negotiated. Towards the end of the period of five years, the defendant sought to renew the lease for the additional period at the same rent but the plaintiff refused to do so for the reason that the defendant had committed a breach of the agreement as he was in arrears for a considerable period and also because the defendant sought to make the payment of the arrears conditional upon renewal of the agreement. The plaintiff states that he told the defendant that he would not renew the agreement when it expired.

The defendant called no evidence. The defence filed by Bhojwani claims that, as no agreement was actually executed, he was a tenant from year to year and as such had not been given the notice required by law.

Section 7(2) of the Landlord and Tenant Ordinance states that: "every agreement for a lease - under which a person to become lessee entered into possession - shall take effect and be construed as a tenancy from year to year, until the lease is actually executed." Mr. Godfrey placed emphasis on this being a statutory provision in the law of Belize and hence distinguishable from the common law principles as evolved in the English law. One must, however, bear in mind that section 4 of our Landlord and Tenant Ordinance provides that such tenancies as are created by section three of the Ordinance which includes a tenancy from year to year, "have the same qualities and incidents as they would have under the common law in England."

It is however, important to note that section 7(2) of Chapter 201 not only provides for such an agreement to be construed as a tenancy from year to year but also provides that the agreement to lease shall take effect and be so construed. The language clearly implies that the terms of the agreement are to take effect, subject only to their consistency with a tenancy from year to year. To interpret the section in any other way would mean that even the rent payable would be unascertainable.

This interpretation is therefore not inconsistent with the express provisions of section 7(2) and, in ascertaining the extent of the application of the terms of the agreement, the incidents of the common law of England would apply. According to the law as applied in England in such circumstances, upon an entry under an agreement for a lease followed by the payment of rent the tenant becomes an yearly tenant upon such of the terms of the agreement as are applicable to a yearly tenancy - an interpretation which I find to be entirely in keeping with the provisions of section 7(2) of chapter 201.

The terms of the agreement "so far controls the implied tenancy, that the tenancy ceases without notice to quit at the end of the agreed term" (vide Doe d. Tilt v. Stratton, 1827, 3 C & P. 164 N.P.) I am entirely in agreement with that statement as the tenant was aware from the very commencement of the tenancy that the tenancy would expire at the end of the stipulated period just as much as he must be aware of the stipulated rent and all other terms of the agreement.

I, therefore, hold that the tenancy granted to the defendant expired at the end of June, 1982 without any formal notice, upon the refusal of the plaintiff to renew the tenancy on the terms offered by the defendant. The plaintiff is entitled to immediate possession of the premises in suit, and I so make my order. The plaintiff has already been granted execution for the sum due as arrears of rent. This leaves only the question of mesne profits to be decided. I also award the plaintiff mesne profits in a sum of $700.00 per month from the 30th of June, 1982 up to the date on which the defendant actually hands over possession of the said premises to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is also awarded the costs of this action.

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