(DAVID
RANCHARAN JR.
((Beneficiary) |
PLAINTIFF |
(
(AND
( |
|
(MANVILLE
RANCHARAN
((Beneficiary)
(RENEL GILHARRY
(BEATRICE GILHARRY
((Executors) |
DEFENDANTS |
Supreme
Court
Action No. 386 of 1981
24th March, 1982.
Moe, J.
Mr. N.
Dujohn, for the Plaintiff
Administration
of Estates - Will - Construction of a Will - Principles
to be used in construing a Will - Whether devise in Will
creating a life interest or a fee simple absolute to the
devisee - Meaning of the word "absolutely" in
a Will - Order 59 Rule 19 of the Supreme Court Rules.
D
E C I S I O N
The question
for determination in this matter is the construction to be
placed on a disposition in a Will. The father of the Plaintiff
by his Will dated 13th March, 1979 disposed of certain lands
in the following terms: -
"I
DEVISE Block No. of 30 acres of land, containing 10 acres
of matured sugar cane, situate about ¼ of a mile
South-West of Carolina Village, in the Pembroke Hall Reserve;
Lot No. 488-Re. Minister's Fiat Grant No. 170 of 1976; Lot
467A, Re. Minister's Fiat, No. 534 of 1975, both lots are
situate in Corozal Town, respectively, to my son David Rancharan
Jr. after my death, for the term of his life, absolutely."
It has
been submitted that on a proper construction the above devise
is to
be interpreted as passing a fee simple absolute to the devisee,
the Plaintiff.
I reaffirm,
first, the cardinal rule of construction applicable to Wills,
that the intention of the Testator must be ascertained from
the words he has used and that intention given effect to where
no rule of law is opposed to it. Now turning to the words
used, and reading, firstly, the devise without the word absolutely,
up to that point the words used include words of limitation
namely "for the term of his life" and would show
an intention to create a life interest. The question then
arises whether the use of the word "absolutely",
thereafter, extends or in anyway effects a construction that
the Testator intended to create a life interest.
The word
"absolutely" has been defined to mean "free
of any fetter in any form". See Clauson J. in Re Ray's
Will Trusts (1936) Ch. 520 at 525. I adopt that meaning
and think that by the use of the word absolutely the Testator
intended that the devisee while retaining the devise for the
term of his life was to be free of any fetter in any form
in his use and enjoyment of it during that term. This meant
that the devise would be at the devisee's absolute disposition.
He could sell it, grant it, grant it away or pass it on by
his Will.
The Testator
appears, therefore, to have had in mind something more than
a life interest for the Plaintiff. This view is reinforced
by the fact that there is no provision in the Will as to what
would happen with the said property after the life of the
Plaintiff. There is no indication that he expected that the
property would be dealt with other than by the Plaintiff.
All of the Testator's known property appears to have been
referred to in the devise under consideration and then there
is a provision which purports to deal with the Testator's
residuary estate.
It is
unnecessary to set out the other provision which purports
to deal with the residuary estate. Suffice it to say that
under it he devises and bequeaths to his Trustees, i.e. the
Executors of his Will, all his residue upon trust for sale,
the Trustees shall hold the net proceeds of the said sale
and conversion of his money upon the following trusts:-
(a)
"Upon trust to pay thereout all his just debts and
funeral and testamentary expenses;
(b)
Upon trust to invest the residue after such payment in their
names in investments authorized by law or otherwise according
to their discretion and to stand possessed of such investment
and all parts of his estate for the time being unsold (hereinafter
called his residuary estate);"
There
is no statement as to who shall be beneficiaries of the trust
established. This clearly is a layman's Will and determination
of the Testator's intention must be considered in that light.
While an absolute interest could have been given in simpler
language, on looking at the whole Will, I have no doubt that
the Testator intended to give the property concerned to his
son David Rancharan Jr., the Plaintiff.
In the
result, I have determined that the devise to the Plaintiff
set out above is an absolute one. It vests in him the parcels
of land contained, therein, absolutely in fee simple. Judgment
accordingly.
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