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(JUAN
DE LA CRUZ MONJES
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PLAINTIFF |
BETWEEN |
(AND
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(CARLOS
LIMA
(ALCATEL INDETEL INDUSTRIA
(DE TELECOMMUNICATION, S.A.C.V. |
FIRST
DEFENDANT
SECOND
DEFENDANT
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Supreme
Court
Action No. 447 of 1998
February 2, 2000
Shanks, J.
Mr. Marshalleck
for the Plaintiff
Mr. Dean Barrow, S.C., for the Defendant
Personal injury accident - Contributory negligence -
Plaintiff largely to blame for the negligence - Whether
second Defendant vicariously liable for the acts of fir
st Defendant in causing accident - Leg injury - Assessment
of general damages in leg and back injury cases- Appropriate
principles applicable.
J U D G M E N T
This is
a claim for damages for personal injury arising out of an
accident suffered by the Plaintiff on the 8th of July, 1998.
I heard evidence from the Plaintiff and the first Defendant,
Mr. Lima.
At the
time of the accident, both the Plaintiff and the first Defendant
were working for the second Defendant who were laying cables
in the Tower Hill Area of the Orange Walk District. Both the
Plaintiff and the first Defendant had been working for the
second Defendant for only three weeks when the accident occurred.
The Plaintiff was a general labourer working with a shovel,
helping to make and refill trenches. The first Defendant was
the driver of a water truck. This was quite a large truck
and had a 10-foot blind spot at the front. On the day in question,
there was a team of about 30 men working at the site with
the Plaintiff. There was also certainly a digger, a backhoe,
and the first Defendant's water truck. The Plaintiff told
me there were about 15 vehicles in all. But although the Defendant
told me about 14 or 15 different vehicles were being used
by Alcatel, he said there were only about three present on
that day. It is common ground that the men stopped work for
lunch at 12:00 p.m. and the first Defendant parked his truck
on the side of the road in a clear grassy area.
The first
Defendant said that he sat in his truck and started eating
his lunch. He told me there were two groups of men, one to
the right under some trees and another to the left in a canefield
also eating their lunch. The Plaintiff denied that there were
any trees around and said that he, therefore, sat in front
of the Defendant's vehicle in order to have some shade in
which to eat his lunch. He told me that he had done this almost
everyday that he had been working with Alcatel and that all
the workers regularly did this.
The first
Defendant said that he had never seen workers sitting in the
shade of vehicles to eat lunch, but he did accept that it
was probable that it had happened on occasion.
There
was in effect no dispute about the circumstances of the accident
itself. The Plaintiff told me he was alone sitting about a
yard in front of the truck and facing in the same direction
as the truck. He had finished his lunch and was waiting to
be told to get back to work when the truck ran over him. He
had no idea it was coming and made no attempt to move out
of the way. The first Defendant told me that while he was
eating his lunch a colleague of his joined him in the cab
and ate with him, that they finished their food after about
15 minutes and then they decided to go and get a soft drink
from somewhere quarter of a mile up the road in the five or
so minutes remaining for lunch. He told me he started his
vehicle, took a moment to put his bag to one side, engaged
first gear which was very noisy, and pulled away. He heard
a crack under the truck and assumed first that someone had
left a bag of rubbish in front of the vehicle. Unfortunately
it wasn't a bag, it was the Plaintiff who not surprisingly
suffered serious injuries as a consequence of the accident
which I will describe later.
As I have
indicated, the areas of disputed fact between the parties
were really not very great. In general where there was a dispute,
I found the first Defendant a more reliable witness. The Plaintiff,
who I am sure was doing his best, was extremely vague about
things and appeared almost dazed. This may well have been
in part a consequence of having to re-live the accident, but
his vagueness about certain things did make his evidence less
reliable. He was extremely vague in particular about the vehicle
being driven by the first Defendant. He didn't know what his
function was and he was convinced that lunch lasted an hour,
which I am convinced by the first Defendant's evidence was
not the case (it probably only lasted 20 or 30 minutes). It
was also the fact that he failed to notice a very noisy truck
starting up about 3 feet away from him. In my judgment, he
must have been either fast asleep or heavily day dreaming
to have done so.
I ,therefore,
find that there were only three vehicles around on that day
and that there was some shade to be had other than beside
the vehicles. I also find that the first Defendant had not
consciously observed workers sitting in the shade of vehicles
previously whilst having lunch, but I accept the Plaintiff's
evidence (in spite of my criticisms) that this may well have
happened from time to time (though not as frequently as he
said) and I find that it was something that both the first
Defendant and his employers should have had in mind as a distinct
possibility. Those are the facts.
Mr. Marshalleck
who appeared for the Plaintiff said that the first Defendant
for whom the second Defendant accept they are vicariously
liable was negligent in driving off without checking his 10-foot
blind spot after he had been sitting for some 20 minutes at
least eating and talking and clearly not watching out all
the time as to who may have sat down in front of the vehicle.
It is perfectly clear that he can't have been looking out
all the time because the Plaintiff managed to sit there without
being observed.
I find
this a difficult decision to make, but I think taking into
account first of all how dangerous these vehicles are, secondly,
the large size of the blind spot with this vehicle and thirdly,
the admitted probability that some workers might be taking
their lunch sitting in the shade of a vehicle, that it was
negligent of the first Defendant to set off driving without
making any attempt to check whether there was anybody or anything
in the blind spot. As I say, I find this a difficult judgment
to make and although I find that the first Defendant was negligent,
I do not believe he was very culpable in respect of that negligence.
Mr. Marshalleck
also says that the second Defendant was directly negligent
in failing to institute some system to prevent this kind of
accident. Mr. Barrow somewhat indignantly suggested that this
was a wholly excessive burden to impose on an employer unless
in this case the employer had actually told the men to sit
in the shade of the truck when taking their lunch. In my judgment,
as I've said, it probably should have been in the contemplation
of the second Defendant employers that men would on occasion
do what the Plaintiff did and this probably cast an onus on
them to institute some kind of system to see that nobody was
run over when the truck was starting off. However, I am not
entirely sure in my own mind what such a system should have
been nor am I 100 percent confident of that conclusion. But,
in any event, in this case it would have made no difference
if such a system had existed because as I've said the first
Defendant set off in his lorry before the lunch was officially
ended in any event. So had there been some system to clear
everybody away at the end of lunch it would not have made
any difference. The only relevant negligence is therefore
the negligence of the first defendant and not the second.
Mr. Barrow
says in any event that this accident was caused or contributed
to by the Plaintiff's negligence in failing to look after
his own safety by sitting down in front of a large truck in
a blind spot when he could have sat under a tree and in failing
to keep an eye on the cab or hear the noise of the engine
being started up. As I've said, the Plaintiff struck me as
rather vague, and I accept that, for the reasons Mr. Barrow
gives, his failure to look after his own safety was also causative
of the accident. Indeed, Mr. Marshalleck conceded as much.
But I don't think his negligence was so serious as to break
the chain of causation or as to amount to a 100 percent contributory
negligence. However, I do consider it the major factor in
causing this accident. And taking account of the low level
of culpability I mentioned on the part of the first Defendant,
I assess Mr. Monjes's responsibility for the accident at two-thirds,
and his damages will be reduced accordingly.
That brings
me to damages. The Plaintiff's evidence about the effect of
the accident on him was this:
"
I had scrapes on my back. I had pain in my lower back. I
had a broken left leg. I had a big operation which has left
me with a scar, one foot long on the outside of my left
leg. There are things that I can no longer do. I can no
longer play ball. I can no longer chop because of my back.
I cannot walk far. I have pain in my legs. I cannot climb
stairs or ladders. I cannot jump. I cannot lift weights.
If I sit too long, I have pain in the back and if I stand
too long as well. My left knee is affected. I cannot kneel,
bend, or stoop. I cannot walk too well. I feel that one
leg is shorter than the other. I have plates inside the
leg which affects me. I have eight screws in the leg and
this affects me when it's cold."
There
was also a medical report from a Doctor Caragon, dated 29th
March, 1999. He described the accident and then he says, the
Plaintiff:
"
was
operated on in the Corozal Hospital by ourselves putting
in a metal plate with 8 screws with a traction in the muscle
of 15 cm which placed the bone in place. Afterwards, he
was ordered for six months to remain bed-ridden. He continued
to go to clinic for six months, once every month. Then he
was given exercise to walk on crutches which was monitored
by X-rays. His present state is good but having difficulties
in moving his legs and also the patient seems to have pain
in his vertebral column due to the massive hit he suffered,
which even though no fractures occurred, he received a severe
trauma in said zone giving him difficulty walking and making
long footsteps, transporting heavy objects, or long walks.
Even so, the patient is in treatment, he is not ready to
do any kind of labour."
Since
that report, the Plaintiff has not worked. As far as I know,
he is not still in treatment, but he is still using a crutch
to help him when he has to stand for a long period. I was
shown a very big operation scar on his left leg, but although
the Plaintiff said he felt one leg was shorter than the other,
Mr. Barrow rightly pointed out that there was no direct evidence
about this.
Taking
all that into account and looking at the Judicial Studies
Board Guidelines, it seems to me this is an injury at the
lower end of what they call a "moderately severe leg
injury" for which the tariff, if I can call it that,
is between 13,250 and 18,250 pound sterling.
Taking
account of the back injury which was additional to the leg,
and also a case which Mr. Marshalleck referred me to from
1992 called Hogue v Smith, I believe that the right
award for this injury in England today would be about 15,000
pounds, that is about $48,076 Bz. From that I deduct 25 percent
to reflect different living standards which gives around $36,000
Bz. To that I add agreed special damages of $314.00 which
results in $36,314. And then applying two-thirds contributory
negligence, I get $12,104 Bz. to which there will be added
interest at 2 percent from the date of the Writ, the 21st
November, 1998.
(After
discussion, Plaintiff's costs to be taxed if not agreed.)
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