|
(BEN BUTENSCHOEN
(DEBORAH BUTENSCHOEN
( |
APPELLANTS |
BETWEEN |
(AND
( |
|
|
(CPL.
#336 LAMBERT WHITE |
RESPONDENT |
Supreme
Court
Inferior Court Appeal No. 4 of 1981
2nd October, 1981.
Alcantara, J.
Mr. J.
N. Avilez, for the Appellants
Mr. G. C. Gandhi, for the Respondent
Inferior
Court Appeal - Conviction - Whether Magistrate correctly
convicted the Appellants with possession of marijuana contrary
to section 5 (b) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance - Joint
possession of dangerous drugs - Elements necessary to prove
joint possession.
J U D G M E N T
This is
appeal from the Inferior Court for the Cayo Judicial District.
The Appellants were convicted and sentenced on the 5th day
of October, 1980 by the learned Magistrate of and for the
following offences: -
"For
that Ben Butenschoen and Deborah Butenschoen on the 25th
day of September, 1980 in the Mountain Pine Ridge area in
the Cayo Judicial District had in their possession a quantity
of leaves, seeds and flowering tops of the Pistilate Plant
Canabis Sativa about 150 lbs. from which the resin has not
been extracted.
Possession
of Dangerous Drugs: Contrary to section 5(b) of the Dangerous
Drugs Ordinance, Chapter 85".
A fine
of $450 was imposed on each with $1.00 costs or in default
4 months imprisonment.
From the
said convictions both Appellants now appeal to this Court
and their grounds of appeal are:
(1)
The decision was unreasonable or could not be supported
having regard to the evidence.
(2)
The decision was erroneous in point of law.
(3)
The decision was based on a wrong principle or was such
that the Inferior Court viewing the circumstances could
not properly have so decided.
(4)
It would seem that the Learned Magistrate based his decision
on knowledge while possession is the essence
of the charge in question; not knowledge.
In Court,
Counsel for the Appellants has combined grounds 1 and 4, thus
leaving only 3 grounds of appeal.
The facts
of the case are as follows: - The police found two bags, later
ascertained to contain 150 lbs. of Indian Hemp, inside the
house of Ben and Deborah Butenschoen, the Appellants. At the
time of finding both Appellants were inside the house, the
male Appellant upstairs where the bags were actually found
and the female Appellant downstairs. When the Police drew
the attention of the Appellants to what they had found, the
male Appellant answered, "It is only herbs"; the
female Appellant answered, "It is only a little bit".
Although
they were not bound to offer any explanation at no time did
any of them deny the presence of the bags upstairs or say
that the bags did not belong to them. They were charged jointly
with being in possession of 150 lbs. of dangerous drugs contrary
to section 5(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Ordinance.
At the
trial the female Appellant did not give evidence. The male
Appellant made an unsworn statement from the dock, but did
not say that the bags did not belong to him or offer any explanation
as to the bags.
The question
which arises for decision is whether the learned Magistrate
was at liberty on the evidence to find that both Appellants
were in possession of the said drugs.
Counsel
for the Appellants says no and draws the attention of the
court to the following authorities:
R
v Irala-Prevost (1965) C.L.R. 606
R
v Searle & Others (1971) C.L.R. 593
R
v Smith (1966) C.L.R. 558
and to
section 9 of Ordinance No. 4 of 1981.
He places
strong reliance on a quotation from R v Searle which
states:
"Mere
knowledge of the presence of a forbidden article in the
hands of a confederate was not enough: joint possession
had to be established."
I agree
with the above proposition, but the decision goes further;
it goes on to say:
"The
sort of direction which ought to have been given was to
ask the jury to consider whether the drugs formed a common
pool from which all had the right to draw at will, and whether
there was a joint enterprise to consume drugs together because
then the possession of drugs by one of them in pursuance
of that common intention might well be possession on the
part of them".
What this
case really decided is that the direction to the jury was
inadequate. If properly directed the jury would have been,
on the evidence adduced, at liberty to convict, if so minded.
The case
of R v Irala-Prevost is also another case of a defective
summing-up. R v Smith is more helpful to the Appellants.
Drugs were found in a room occupied by Defendant. The direction
by the judge to the jury could be construed as saying that
she must necessarily control everything in it. The Court of
Criminal Appeal held that this was a wrong direction. I cannot
but agree.
However
in R v Smith the Defendant not only denied all knowledge
of the drugs but gave evidence to that effect and to the fact
that the room was used in common with other persons.
In the
present case neither of the Appellants denied knowledge or
the existence of the bags found and apart from the unsworn
statement of the male Appellant no evidence has been given
denying knowledge of the drugs. In fact the evidence at the
trial points to the other direction.
Counsel
for the Respondent has made a very comprehensive analysis
of the law on this subject starting with Wagner v Metropolitan
Police Commissioner (1968) 52 C.A.R. He has also referred
me to the following:
R
v Cavendish 45 C.A.R. 374
R
v Peaston 69 C.A.R. 203
and to
Archbold's 40th Edition paragraph 3391.
It is
unnecessary for me to quote from any of these authorities.
I find that the Magistrate was perfectly entitled on the evidence
to draw the inference that both Appellants were in joint possession
of the drugs found. He would have been at liberty to convict
merely on the evidence that they were so found, though not
bound to convict. He was fortified in reaching a finding of
guilty by the fact that there was no denial of the existence
of the bags or explanation given. In fact the answers of both
Appellants to the Police were evidence he could use to reach
his decision. I find that the Magistrate reached the right
decision.
Although
there is no appeal against sentence, I think that under the
Laws of Belize I am entitled to increase or decrease the sentence
imposed. I have the impression that the sentence in this case
was somewhat on the low side, taking into account that the
quantity found could be described as a commercial quantity.
However, I shall be guided by the learned Magistrate on this
occasion and will not disturb the sentence imposed.
Appeal
dismissed.
----------OO-----------
|