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(PAOLA
FIORE |
PLAINTIFF |
BETWEEN |
(
(AND
( |
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(PARADISE INTERNATIONAL CORP. LTD. |
RESPONDENT
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Supreme
Court
Action No. 518 of 1998
3rd February, 2000
Shanks, J.
Ms. S.
Musa for the Plaintiff
Mr. Zuniga for the Defendant
Lease
Agreement - Breach of Agreement by Respondent - Respondent
purporting to terminate Lease Agreement contrary to option
clause allowing renewal of Lease Agreement - Whether option
clause was void for uncertainty - Assessment of damages
for breach of Lease Agreement Factors taken into account.
J
U D G M E N T
This is a claim for damages by Paola Fiore against Paradise
International Corporation Ltd. for breach of a Lease Agreement
dated the 3rd December, 1997. The Lease is for a deli/bar
at the Paradise Resort Hotel in San Pedro. I was referred
to the relevant Clauses of the Lease as follows:
"Mrs.
Paola Fiore will:
"(5) |
be
responsible for a good reputation as this reflects on
Paradise Resort Hotel; |
(6) |
abide
with all rules and regulations set by law with respect
to Food Handling Certificates for all staff and maintain
a high standard of conduct and service; |
(11) |
pay
Paradise Resort Hotel 10% of any food and bar tabs charged
by the guests of the Paradise Resort Hotel for the months
December 1997 to May 1998. With effect from June 1998,
the lease holder will pay Paradise Resort Hotel 5% of
any food and bar tabs." |
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"In
consideration of the above Ms Paola Fiore will be granted
a one year lease with an option to renew for a further
year and would pay Paradise Resort Hotel lease payment
of two months in advance in the first instance and thereafter
on the first day of each month in advance rental payment,
BZ$1,500.00 per month with a grace period of 15 days maximum.
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At
the end of each lease year, Paradise International Corporation
will have the option to negotiate for the following year's
rental for the buildings, which cannot be increased by
more than 20% percent annually. |
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Failure
to comply with any condition set in this Agreement will
result in the issuing of a letter of warning and a grace
period of one month in order to allow lease holder to
rectify any discrepancies. If following the grace period
conditions are still not complied with, it may lead to
the cancellation of this contract." |
Ms. Fiore
took up occupation of the deli/bar and started business there
and the business as far as she was concerned was progressing
well until the 12th of May, 1998 when Mr. Zuniga acting for
the Defendant wrote a letter which recited those conditions
(5) and (6), which I have read out and then set out six, "negative
comments" which had apparently been received from clients
from the hotel about Ms. Fiore. The letter ended as follows:
"I
have been instructed to write you and demand that you rectify
these breaches during the next month failing which the Lease
Agreement may be cancelled."
That clearly
was in reliance on the provision for termination which I have
just read. In reaction to that, Ms. Fiore went and had a look
at a book which is maintained in the hotel where visitors
write their comments along the lines set out in Mr. Zuniga's
letter but she told me that they were all from one particular
group of people who had complained, quite unjustifiably, about
something that arose which I need not go into. Mr. Zuniga
has also produced to the Court three letters apparently from
clients of the hotel which set out other complaints which
may have formed the subject matter of his letter of the 12th
of May, 1998.
Although
the letter said that there may be a cancellation after a month
in fact nothing happened at all and business continued well
and Ms. Fiore told me that guests were happy and enjoyed the
bar and the facilities she offered. Then came Hurricane Mitch
on, I think, the 25th of October, 1998. In the Hurricane,
the bar premises were badly damaged and became unusable after
that and Ms. Fiore told me that she made contact with the
owners of the hotel (in particular a Japanese gentleman called
Mr. Nakogawa) who she contacted through his agent, Mr. Shabano.
Those two gentlemen came to the island to San Pedro on or
around the 7th or 8th of November, 1998. They met Ms. Fiore,
they shook her by the hand, thanked her and said that there
would be a meeting the next day. That meeting duly took place
and at the meeting she was told out of the blue, as far as
she was concerned, that her Lease which was to expire in December
of 1998 would not be renewed, notwithstanding the Clause which
provides an option for renewal which I have referred to. Three
days later, another letter came from Mr. Zuniga which was
dated the 11th of November which referred back to his letter
of warning of the 12th of May, 1998 and stated that almost
six months had passed and then said:
"You
persist in being as one hotel guest complained on the 14th
of August, 1998 "Paola is the worst person we have
ever seen in our lives" with reference to you the guests
begged my client to "please do something about this
hysterical person if you really love your guests" and
the letter continued. "Consequent upon your failure
to maintain a high standard of conduct and service as mandated
by Clause 6 of the Agreement, I have been instructed to
notify you that the Agreement will not be renewed after
it expires on the 2nd December, 1998."
I had
no direct evidence about the complaint to which Mr. Zuniga
referred in his letter of 11th November, 1998 save that words
to the effect he had quoted were apparently in the book maintained
in the hotel. The response from Ms. Fiore was to which she
did on November 24, 1998. The letter rejected the complaints
and stated that it was Ms. Fiore's intention to exercise he
option of renewing the Lease for a further year and that she
vehemently objected to and challenged the unfair decision
to end the Lease. However, in spite of that letter, the Lease
was not renewed. Ms. Fiore was kept out of possession of the
deli/bar, but it was duly repaired and it was ready to do
business again early in January and it was given to someone
else to operate. Those are the facts.
The issues
it seems to me are three:
(1) |
Was
the Defendant entitled to cancel or not renew the Lease
Agreement? |
(2) |
Was
the Plaintiff entitled to renew under the Option Clause
which I have read? |
(3) |
What
damages is the Plaintiff entitled to if she was indeed
entitled to renew? |
The first
issue is whether the Defendant was entitled to cancel the
contract. I have referred to the letter of the 12th of May,
1998. Assuming in the Defendant's favour that there were preexisting
breaches of Clauses 5 and 6 on that date and the letter was
therefore a proper letter, it was nevertheless necessary in
order to terminate the Agreement in my judgment for the Defendant
to show that during and after the initial month there were
still breaches of the Agreement and also that they had exercised
the right to terminate within a reasonable time. That they
clearly failed to do. In fact, six months went by and they
then wrote the letter of 11th of November, 1998. That as I
have said, referred to one complaint of the 14th of August
and it purported to rely on Clause 6 of the Agreement. Clause
6 of the Agreement required Ms Fiore to maintain a high standard
of conduct and service. To show a breach of Clause 6 would
clearly require some evidence from the Defendant and as I
have said, I have no direct evidence in relation to the complaint
at all. So it seems to me that the Defendant was not entitled
to terminate as they purported to do, first of all because
there was a failure to comply with the termination provisions
and secondly because there was in any event no admissible
evidence of any breach of Clause 6. I should say there was
also as far as I can see no evidence of a breach of Clause
5. This equally required proof of some behaviour by Ms. Fiore
and in any event, there was only one isolated complaint from
August, 1998 which in my judgment could never be said on its
own to lead to the undermining of the whole reputation of
the Paradise Resort Hotel.
I turn
then to the second question, namely whether Ms Fiore was entitled
to renew. I have referred to the "option to renew"
Clause. That option was clearly properly exercised by Ms.
Musa's letter of the 24th of November, 1998. However, Mr.
Zuniga says that the entire Clause giving the option to renew
was void for uncertainty because of the Clause that comes
after it which is as follows:
"At
the end of each lease year Paradise International Corporation
will have the option to negotiate for the following year's
rental fee for the buildings which cannot be increased by
more than 20 percent annually"
He referred
me to a case called Kings Motors v. Lacks, 1969. 3 A.E.R.
665. In that case there was an option in a Lease for a
further term "at such rental as may be agreed between
the parties" and it was decided that in the absence of
an arbitration Clause that term was void for uncertainty.
He also referred me to a case called Brown v. Gold, 1971,
2 A.E.R. 1505 which states that, "unless driven to
it, a court is very reluctant to hold void for uncertainty
any provision which was intended to have legal effect":
that statement arose in the context of an option to renew
a lease as here. Ms. Musa also referred me to Halsbury's
Laws Vol. 27 Par. 114 which states that "if an option
does not state the terms of renewal, the new Lease will be
for the same period and on the same terms as the original
lease so far as those terms arise out of the relationship
of landlord and tenant."
It seems
to me that my first job in approaching this is to construe
the Lease Agreement bearing in mind that it was put together
by laymen and that it was certainly designed to have legal
effect. The option given to Ms. Fiore to renew standing on
its own works perfectly well and the rent on the second year
on the renewed year would clearly be $1,500.00 Bz in the absence
of any other Clause. Then comes the next Clause which is the
one that Mr. Zuniga relies on which gives the Defendant, Paradise
International Corporation, an option to negotiate about the
rental in each Lease year after the first. It seems to me
that Ms. Musa is right to say that this is an option, if anything,
given to the Defendant and that they didn't take up that option
as they might have done. If they had done so a number of things
might have happened. If the matter had come to court, the
court might have said that it was too vague an option to be
enforceable because it is always open to parties to negotiate
about rent in the future. Or the Court might have enforced
it by saying that there was an obligation on Ms. Fiore to
negotiate in good faith about the rent for the next year.
Or, most favourably to the Defendant, the Court might have
construed it as allowing them to impose a 20 percent increase.
But none of this happened and, as I say, the best result for
the Defendant would have been a 20 percent increase in the
rent for the second year. What they in fact did was to fail
to allow a renewal pursuant to an option which was properly
exercised by Ms. Fiore. They were therefore in breach of contract
and must pay damages for depriving Ms. Fiore of the opportunity
of making money out of running the deli and bar for the second
year of Lease.
That brings
me to damages. As I say, the deli/bar was rebuilt by early
January 1999 and Ms. Fiore would have therefore had another
11 months of business from it. She told me and it wasn't challenged
that she made $36,734.00 net out of this business in the first
11 months. Being conservative, I would therefore award her
damages of $35,000.00 for the breach which I have mentioned
to represent the loss of 11 month's business in 1999.
Mr. Zuniga
raised a point on mitigation and said that Ms. Fiore had failed
to mitigate because as was accepted she had done nothing to
get a new business going between January, 1999 and December,
1999. When this was put to her she explained that her failure
to do anything arose because this was the wrong time of the
season to start a new business and that the appropriate time
to do that was in December. I have no way of judging whether
that was correct but the fact was that Mr. Zuniga did not
challenge her about it and didn't call any evidence to show
that it wasn't the case and I therefore on the basis of her
evidence accept that she has done her best to mitigate her
damage and that she is therefore entitled to the full amount
I mentioned which is $35,000.00. So there will be judgment
for $35,000.00.
She will
also have costs to be taxed if not agreed.
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