|
(Eduvijes
Cantun
( |
APPELLANT |
BETWEEN
|
(AND
( |
|
|
(P.C. Clarke |
RESPONDENT
|
Supreme
Court
Inferior Appeal No. 5 of 1978
30th May, 1980
Barington-Jones, J.
Mr. J.C.
Gray for the Appellant
Mr. H. Elrington for the Respondent
Inferior
Court Appeal against conviction and sentence - Resident
Magistrate convicting Defendant but failing to make a precise
finding whether he believed the prosecution witness - Conviction
set aside as unsafe and trial de novo ordered.
J
U D G M E N T
The Appellant
was convicted of Drunken Driving contrary to section 74 of
the Road and traffic Ordinance on the 10th February, 1978
by the Resident Magistrate for the Corozal Judicial District.
The Appellant now appeals against conviction and sentence.
Mr. Gray
submitted that the basis of the appeal in this case was that
the facts were such that the lower court ought not to have
convicted the Appellant . Mr. Gray took issue with the penultimate
paragraph of the learned Magistrate's Reasons for Decision
where he said:-
"These
contradictions in their statements and the prosecution's
witnesses statements that the defendant was found behind
the driver's wheel when they approached the truck lead to
the inference that the defendant was driving or was in charge
of the truck at the material time."
Mr. Gray
felt that for the learned Magistrate to draw such inferences
from the facts made the conviction unsatisfactory and he said
that such an inference might equally be consistent with innocence.
I must
say that I find it difficult to understand why the learned
Resident Magistrate felt constrained to find that there was
only an inference that the Appellant was driving or was in
charge of the truck at the material time; for if one looks
at the evidence of the prosecution witnesses there is to be
found direct evidence of the Accused driving the vehicle in
question. Cpl. Rene said that he saw an unlit truck traveling
ahead of him and that upon reaching abreast of it, the truck
stopped and "I saw the defendant behind the driving wheel,
1eaning on the steering". P.C. Clarke also gave similar
evidence that on drawing up beside the vehicle he noticed
that the driver (whom he identified as the Appellant) appeared
to be drunk.
It is
appropriate at this point to say that the appeal was conducted
on the basis that it was not the Appellant who was driving
the truck at the material time, the question of his drunkenness
being admitted.
The Appellant's
evidence and that of his two witnesses (i.e. those who were
travelling with him) was that the truck was being driven by
Victor the Appellant's son. However there are noticeable discrepancies
in that evidence, more particularly concerning their various
positions in the cab of the truck.
It is
to be noted that the learned Resident Magistrate warned himself
that the prosecution were required to prove that the Appellant
was at the material time driving or attempting or in charge
of a motor vehicle; and he formally found as a fact that the
Appellant was driving at the material time; but he was incorrect
to say that the prosecution witnesses were not able to identify
the driver as the Appellant for both Cpl. Rene and P.C. Clarke
positively identified the Appellant as the driver of the vehicle
in the respective evidence before the court below.
The learned
Resident Magistrate makes no precise finding as to whether
he believed the prosecution witnesses or not, and appears
to have misdirected himself in his Reasons for Decision on
the question of the identification of the Appellant as the
driver of the vehicle at the material time. This leads me
to view that the conviction is unsafe and unsatisfactory and
accordingly the appeal must be allowed and the conviction
quashed and the sentence set aside.
I have
given careful thought to the question of a re-trial more particularly
since this trial took place as long ago as the 10th February,
1978; but have come to the conclusion that in the interests
of justice there should be a re-trial in this case, and I
accordingly order that there should be a trial de novo before
another magistrate.
|