BelizeLaw.Org
The JudiciaryThe Supreme CourtLegal Aide-LibraryLaws of BelizeServices

History of the Supreme Court Building

The Chief Justice of Belize

Chief Justices of Belize, 1843 - 2000

Meet the Justices

The Supreme Court Registry

The Law Library

Supreme Court Judgments
(ANTONIO GUTIERREZ
(
PLAINTIFF
BETWEEN (AND
(
(CORNELIO EK DEFENDANT

Supreme Court
Action No. 87 of 1976
14th February, 1980
Moe, J.

Mr. P. Zuniga for the Plaintiff
Mr. J. C. Gray for the Defendant

Assessment of damages from traffic accident injuries - Principles applicable in determining quantum of general damages.


J U D G M E N T

  1. In this action the plaintiff claims damages for injuries and loss sustained as a result of an accident which occurred on the 10th September, 1975 and which he alleges to be due to the negligent driving of the Defendant.

  2. In the support of the claim, the plaintiff himself and two other witnesses gave their version as to how the accident took place. The plaintiff said that sometime between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. on the 10th September, 1975 he was cutting grass some distance from the edge of the San Joaquin Road and the next thing he recalls is that he woke up in the Hospital. Both of the plaintiff's witnesses state that on the 10th September, 1975 sometime after 5:00 p.m. the plaintiff was cutting grass some distance from the edge of the road, when the Defendant drove a pick-up along the said road in a zig-zag manner and struck the Plaintiff.

  3. The Defendant gave a different version of the manner in which the plaintiff came to be struck and said that on the date in question while driving a Pick-up on the right side of the road through San Joaquin, he saw the plaintiff riding a bicycle about 25 yards in front of him. Another motor vehicle was coming from the other direction with its bright lights on. The plaintiff attempted to cross the road and he the defendant slowed down and avoided the plaintiff. He heard noises at the back of the pick-up and he stopped. He went to the back of the pick-up and saw that he had struck the plaintiff. This version of the accident came up for the first time when the Defendant was in the witness stand. The Defendant's evidence was not in keeping with his pleading nor was his version of the accident put to the plaintiff or his witnesses both of which circumstances I presume were due to instructions given to his solicitor. Further his version is not consistent with the fact that the plaintiff having been struck was picked up about twenty feet from the edge of the road. This was deposed to by the plaintiff's wife whose evidence on this point was not challenged nor refuted in any way.

  4. I accepted the version given by the plaintiff and his witnesses as to the manner in which the accident occurred and found that the plaintiff was struck by the Pick-up driven by the Defendant while the plaintiff was some distance about 10 feet from the edge of the road. The Defendant drove the Pick-up in a zig-zag manner along the San Joaquin Road, and struck the Plaintiff. There was no other vehicle on the road at the time.

  5. Consequently I held that the Defendant was guilty of negligence and that that negligence was the sole cause of the accident.

  6. From the spot where he lay after being struck by the Pick-up, the Plaintiff was taken to the Corozal Town Hospital and examined by Dr. Anthony Gill who find him to be suffering from severe concussion resulting in left sided hemi-paresis, that is, impairment of function on the left side of the body. I found that these injuries to the plaintiff were sustained as a result of the negligence of the Defendant. As a consequence the plaintiff was hospitalized for three weeks and after discharge from the hospital received massages over some period on his left hand and left leg. The weakness on his left side is now permanent. Flexion on the finger joints, wrists and elbow of the left hand and in the knee and hip of the left leg is very limited. The plaintiff is unable to grip with his left hand, has to drag his left leg and cannot walk unaided for more than 30 feet. He tends to forget things. At the date of the accident the plaintiff was 58 years old.

  7. The plaintiff claimed as special damages (a) expenses incurred for medical attention, (b) transportation expenses, and (c) loss of his bicycle. I was satisfied as to the amounts claimed as expenses for medical attention and transportation and allow the amounts claimed in the sum of $294.00 and $622.74 respectively. The plaintiff did not satisfy the Court that his bicycle was lost as a result of the defendant's negligence nor did he prove as required on items of special damage. What was his damage in this regard? I therefore did not allow anything for this claim. The total amount allowed as special damages then is $916.74.

  8. On the question of general damages I adopted the approach laid down in Cornelliac v. St. Louis (1965) 7 W. I. R 491 and took into account the following circumstances: (a) the nature and extent of the injuries, (b) the physical disabilities which have resulted, (c) pain and suffering, (d) the loss of amenities suffered, and (e) loss of pecuniary prospects. I have set out above the evidence in regard to factors (a), (b) and (c). As to loss of amenities, the plaintiff's evidence is that he cannot bend, cannot cut his grass for his animals and he cannot ride his bicycle anymore. This loss such as it is must also be weighed in assessing the damages.

  9. On the question of pecuniary prospects or as it was presented the probable loss of profits, I have before me only the plaintiff's statement of his profits for the years 1974 to 1978 inclusive. The plaintiff recounted amounts worked out for him by someone. This evidence was not challenged or refuted in any way. It showed that after the accident and the injuries resulting therefrom, there was a drop in 1976 of about $3,330.00 or by 60% in his yearly profits from the sale of cane which he grows and sells for a livelihood. But 1977 showed an increase of $300 over the 1976 profits and 1978 showed an increase of $600 over the 1977 takings. If this rate of increase continued, by 1980 he would be back to his pre-accident level of profit. It would appear from the evidence therefore that his future loss of profits would not be substantial. However, I was satisfied that the plaintiff had suffered some loss of earning capacity, in the first place there was the above mentioned drop in his profits for three years preceding trial and in all probability due to his injuries and the resulting physical disability he will have to give up working his land and selling cane earlier than a man in his position normally would have done. I was guided by the principle laid down in Bonham-Carter v. Hyde Park Hotel Ltd. (1948) 64 T.R. 177 and felt it incumbent upon me to estimate his loss in this regard and make an award in respect of it. Taking into account the factual loss as indicated above and bearing in mind the probabilities of early retirement, I estimated the probable loss in this regard at $15,000 less 10 % for tax purposes leaving the sum of $l3,500. I then scale it down by one-third in view of the fact that the plaintiff is about to get a lump sum and for imponderables and contingencies. See Jamaica Omnibus Services Ltd., & Mc Cain v. Caldarola & Lopez (1966) 10 W. I. R 114 on appeal at (1966) 10 W. I. R. 117. I therefore arrive at an amount of $9,125.00.

  10. In determining what amount in the circumstances would be a proper award in respect of general damages (i.e. in addition to the sums for loss of profits) I adhered to the principle that there ought to be some degree of unanimity for awards made in respect of injuries of particular type and that whilst doing so courts must have regard to awards made by other courts in the locality and also to social, economic and industrial conditions. I was not able to find a local case or one from a neighbouring locality that fits neatly with the instant case. But I was minded of the decision in Ottley v. De Freitas et al (1968) 13 W. I. R. 498 where it is pointed out at pg. 500 that "in ascertaining trends in awards on comparable cases … attention need not be restricted to cases in which the nature of the injuries and the gravity of the consequences suffered bear a close affinity to a complainant's."

  11. The approach I therefore adopted was to consider awards of general damages in cases which involved loss of use of limbs.

    (1) There is Jamaica Bus Services V. Caldarola (1965) 8 W. I. R. 114 where the plaintiff who suffered severe injury to right elbow resulting in loss of power of right hand was awarded £3,600 under this head or $9,000.

    (2) In Boochoon & Ramsingh v. Gocool (1967) 12 W. I. R. 359 the plaintiff in his middle fifties vas injured in a motor collision whereby he sustained compound comminuted fractures of his right leg resulting in 40% permanent disability. Awarded $7,500 general damages.

    (3) The plaintiff in Ottley v. Defreitas (1968) 13 W. I. R, 498 was left permanently partially disabled from injuries to his left leg and right pelvis sustained in a motor-car collision and received $8,500 general damages.

    (4) Then there is John v. Skeete (1970) 17 W. I. R. 7 where the Plaintiff sustained compound fracture of left leg and a 10 inch long wound in left forearm leaving fingers, wrist and elbow of left arm stiff and left leg functionless. After skin graft and physiotherapy, leg improved but 1½ inches shorter than other, walks with limp. 35% partial permanent disability. Awarded $17,00 general damages.

  12. Guiding myse1f as best I can by the principles outlined above and giving the matter the best judgment I can I award the sum of $12,500 in respect of circumstances (a) to (d).

  13. Judgment for Plaintiff in the sum of $916.74 Special Damages and $21,625.00 General Damages. Costs to be Taxed.

top of page
Home | The Judiciary | The Supreme Court | Legal Aid | e-Library | Laws of Belize | Contact Us