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(LLOYD
BODDEN
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APPELLANT |
BETWEEN |
(AND
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(CORPORAL
OF POLICE
(NO. 30 E. ITZA |
RESPONDENT |
Supreme
Court
Inferior Court Appeal No. 15 of 1983
24th August, 1983
Moe, CJ.
Mr. Allan
Pitts, for the Appellant.
Mr. G. Quallo, for the Respondent.
Inferior
Court Appeal - Appeal against conviction for charge of exposing
liquor for sale without a licence contrary to section 43(1)(a)
of the Intoxicating Liquor Ordinance, Chapter 159 - Meaning
of the phrase "expose for sale" - Evidence necessary
to establish that liquor was exposed for sale.
D
E C I S I O N
The Appellant
was charged that on the 3rd day of November, 1982 he exposed
liquor for sale at the Malibu Club at 128 East Collet Canal
whilst not the holder of a licence authorising him to sell
such liquor, contrary to section 43(1)(a) of the Intoxicating
Liquor Licensing Ordinance, Cap. 159.
There
were only two witnesses before the magistrate, one a policeman
for the Prosecution and the other, the Appellant himself.
The policeman's evidence was that on the 3rd November, 1982
about 12:57 p.m., in uniform, he visited the Malibu Club where
he found the door open. There, behind the bar, he saw one
Alda Alvarado, whom he asked for a licence. He looked on the
wall behind the bar and didn't see a liquor licence displayed.
He took a quantity of liquor from off the shelves of the club,
namely a 1/4 bottle of Haig Whisky, 1/4 bottle of Belizean
rum, a 3/4 bottle of Tropical Brandy and unopened bottles
of Doorly's and Charcoal rum. (These were tendered in evidence)
He also said that while at the club that day, he observed
Ms. Alvarado selling a coke on ice to someone. There were
stools by the bar, chairs and tables in the building. The
doors and windows of the club were open. He said the Appellant
is owner of the club. The Defendant said he lives at 128 East
Collet Canal, a two storey building. The Malibu is at that
address. He operated the Malibu Club in the past, up to May
1982. He didn't give anyone permission to sell liquor. From
the time he closed the club, he only used the premises for
eating, washing and cooking. The liquor that was there was
that which was left-over. In cross-examination, he admitted
that even though his licence had expired from 31st December,
1981, he didn't renew the licence for 1982. He said that he
was granted a licence in June, 1982, but didn't renew it,
because he had closed down.
He was
convicted and now appeals against the conviction on three
grounds namely:-
(1)
that the decision was unreasonable or could not be supported
having regard to the evidence;
(2)
the decision is erroneous in point of law in that the magistrate
did not interpret correctly the phrase expose for sale in
the particular section of the Ordinance; and
(3)
the decision was based on a wrong principle or was such
that the magistrate viewing the circumstances reasonably
could not properly have so decided.
The three
grounds were combined and presented as different aspects of
the submission that the magistrate wrongly held that the liquor
was exposed for sale. It was contended that the evidence does
not support a finding that the liquor was exposed for sale.
The following circumstances were referred to. There was evidence
only that the bottles of liquor were on shelves, no evidence
that they were priced, that they were dealt with, that anyone
was selling liquor, no evidence that the policeman attempted
to purchase, no evidence that there were glasses, no evidence
that the Defendant was there. Reference was made to a decision,
in the Inferior Court Appeal No. 1 of 1975 Franklin Williams
v. Shamah, which in my view was concerned with an offense
of selling certain price controlled items in excess of the
controlled price without the written permission of the Controller
of Supplies and does not assist in this case. Counsel for
the Respondent submitted that the circumstances must be looked
at objectively.
I wish
to stress only that the charge was exposing for sale and the
evidence referred to by Counsel for the Appellant as absent
is not necessary to establish exposure for sale. In my view,
the evidence outlined above was evidence on which a Court
could come to a decision that the liquor was exposed for sale
and the magistrate having seen and heard the witnesses said
she believed beyond all reasonable doubt that the liquor was
exposed for sale.
Counsel
for the Appellant also contended that there was not sufficient
evidence on which the magistrate could find that the Defendant
exposed the liquor for sale. He argued that the Defendant's
knowledge that the bottles of liquor were there doesn't mean
he the Defendant exposed them for sale. Counsel for the Respondent
referred to the evidence that the Defendant is owner of the
club, responsible for it and there was no evidence that he
did anything to indicate that the liquor was not for sale.
It appears from the reasons for decision that the magistrate
having concluded that the liquor was exposed for sale, went
on to consider the offence in relation to the Appellant. She
adverted to the question whether it was established that the
Appellant did not have a licence under this Ordinance authorising
him to sell that liquor, her finding on which is not challenged.
She then referred to the Appellant's ownership of the club.
She stated, "The Defendant (Appellant) admitting that
the premises of the Malibu Club were his, was found guilty
of the offence charged."
The evidence
of the Defendant's ownership of the club was only a part of
the whole evidence of circumstances from which the magistrate
could attribute the act in question, exposing for sale, to
the Defendant. She came to the conclusion that he did and
I see no reason to disturb that finding.
Appeal
dismissed. Respondent to have costs.
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