Supreme Court
Action No. 230 of 1977
19th March, 1981.
Moe, J.

Mr. Glen Godfrey for the Plaintiff
Mr. D. Courtenay, S.C. for the First Defendant
Mr. J.C. Gray for the Second Defendant

Declaration that expulsion from Trade Union is unlawful, null and void - Injuction restraining Executive Committee of the Union and Union Members from enforcing the expulsion from Union or interference with Union benefits - Damages for breach of contract of membership with Union - Interest - Cost - Judgment for Plaintiff.

J U D G M E N T

In this matter the Plaintiff clamed:- (1) A declaration that the resolution expelling him from the Christian Workers Union, a Trade Union, is null and void and/or unlawful; (2) an injunction to restrain the executive committee and each and every member thereof from enforcing the said resolution or interfering with his use and enjoyment of the benefits of membership of the said Union; (3) Damages for breach by the said Union of his contract of membership with the said Union; (4) the sum of $1,200.00 as retirement benefit from the First Defendant; (5) Damages for breach of contract by the first defendant; (6) Interest; and (7) Costs.

2. At the conclusion of the Plaintiff's case, Counsel for the First Defendant submitted and Counsel for the Plaintiff conceded that there was no case for the First Defendant to answer. The submission was upheld and judgment entered for the First Defendant. I now proceed to determine the claim in relation to the Second Defendant.

3. It is common ground between the parties that the Plaintiff was a member of the Christian Workers Union which is a Trade Union duly registered under the provisions of the Trade Union Ordinance, CAP 142. The Second Defendants are the Trustees of the said Union. There was further common ground that on the 27th day of October 1975 the Executive Committee of the Union took a decision to expel the Plaintiff from the Union for a period not exceeding ninety and nine years, and that decision was communicated to the Plaintiff by letter of the same date.

4. The authorities show that unless a trade union is given power by its constitution to expel its members, a member of such a union cannot be expelled. It is stated in Trade Union Law (1950) p. 175 Citrine that the rules of a Trade Union "constitute the contract existing between the members and the Union, upon the exact terms of which will depend the objects and powers of the Union and the rights and liabilities of both parties." Quoted with approval in Bonsor v. Musicians' Union [1956] A.C. 104 by Lord Denning who pointed out that the contract by every incoming member of a trade union is one between him and the Union whereby he, for his part, agrees to abide by the rules of the Union, and the Union for its part, impliedly agrees that he shall not be excluded except in accordance with the rules. See also Halsbury's Laws 3rd Edition, para. 614. Now the Constitution of the Union put before the Court makes no provision for expulsion by the Union of its members. Consequently, I hold that the purported expulsion of the Plaintiff from the Union by the Executive Committee was unlawful and null and void. The Plaintiff will have a declaration and supporting injunction accordingly.

5. Again, as shown above, there was a contract between the Plaintiff and the Union. It follows that the unlawful expulsion of the Plaintiff from the Union was a breach of that contract. For that breach he is entitled to damages. See Bonsor v. Musicians' Union (ibid).

6. In his Statement of Claim the Plaintiff claimed that as a result of his unlawful expulsion from the Union, he has been prevented and/or inhibited from obtaining employment as a waterfront worker and stevedore. Further or in the alternative, the Trustees of the Union instructed the First Defendant to discontinue hiring him on the waterfront thereby inducing a breach of the contract of employment between him and the First Defendant.

7. The Second Defendant had pleaded in para.4 of his defence that the Plaintiff was not unlawfully expelled from the said Union and his expulsion did not affect his obtaining employment.

8. The Plaintiff gave evidence that he is a stevedore and has been a member of the Union from its inception around 1962 until 27th October 1975 when he received the letter of expulsion. At that time he was working on the waterfront as a whole with a number of companies but mainly with Euro Caribe Shipping Services. He said that after his expulsion he was able to work with only one company, namely, Belize Estate Co. Ltd. He had tried to get work with other stevedoring companies but failed. This was qualified under cross-examination and he admitted that in 1976 he was employed as a stevedore by United Brands. He also admitted that he had a preference to work with Belize Estate Company because it made more money and this preference existed even before expulsion.

9. The Plaintiff stated that the first instance of refusal to employ him after his expulsion was with the company Euro Caribe Shipping Services. When he went to work, the foreman, Reginald Dixon, did not put him on the gang of workers and told him he knew why he couldn't be taken on. He alleged that the Union told the foreman not to employ him. Mr. Reginald Dixon gave evidence that he got an order directly from the Union's Shop-steward Terrence Lord who told him that the Union said Clinton Young is not to be employed. Mr. Dixon explained that it was only in pursuance of that order that he did not take on the Plaintiff. He, the foreman, was never instructed by his employer, Euro Caribe Shipping Services, not to employ the Plaintiff. There was no other evidence of specific instances of refusal to employ the Plaintiff. The remainder of his evidence was concerned with amount of wages earned.

10. For the Second Defendant, Mr. Desmond Vaughan, President of the Union, gave evidence that the Union issued no instructions with respect to the Plaintiff's work. He did not cause any instructions to be issued to Reginald Dixon concerning the Plaintiff nor did he instruct Euro Caribe Shipping Services or any of its officers concerning the Plaintiff. He termed it a fabrication for Mr. Dixon to say that Terrence Lord said that the Union instructed that the Plaintiff was not to work. He was sure Mr. Lord did not say so. He saw no reason for Mr. Lord to tell this to the foreman. He explained that the Union would have to tell the Company first, then they would have to pass instructions down to the foreman.

11. Now I held that on a balance of probabilities Terrence Lord did tell Mr. Dixon that the Plaintiff was not to be employed. But I found that there was not sufficient evidence on which I could hold either: -

(a) that Terrence Lord bound the Union by his statement to Mr. Dixon; or

(b) that his statement to Mr. Dixon could be held to be instructions to Euro Caribe Shipping Services the First Defendant. There was no other evidence on the issue whether the Union had induced a breach of contract between the Plaintiff and the First Defendant. Further there was not enough before me on which I could hold that there was a contract of employment between the Plaintiff and the First Defendant. Consequently the Plaintiff fails in his claim that the Union induced a breach of contract between himself and the First Defendant.

12. On the question whether the Plaintiff, as a result of the expulsion was prevented or inhibited from gaining employment as a stevedore, his own evidence was that he worked as a stevedore with Belize Estate Company Ltd. after expulsion from1976. He always had a preference for work with that firm and indeed he worked up to 1978. The Plaintiff's evidence was that before expulsion he was able to earn from his work on the waterfront about $1250 - $1500 per year. After expulsion, he was able to earn only about $250 - $300 per year. This evidence was qualified by his answers in cross-examination. He admitted that he worked for the majority of his earnings from Belize Estate. He would work on every ship with Belize Estate but because of the gang system he could not work on every ship with other firms like Euro Caribe. He had a preference to work with Belize Estate because they made more money. Before expulsion, if Belize Estate and Euro Caribe had ships to be worked, he would work for Belize Estate. He agreed that because of his preference he worked for minimum amounts from other firms.

13. The president of the Union Mr. Desmond Vaughan gave evidence that registered waterfront workers, (as the Plaintiff was) of members of the Union are first to be called in the gang to work. If registered and not a member of the Union, such a worker gets second preference. Mr. Mike Rosado, the secretary and general treasurer of the Union said that the gang system always existed on the waterfront. The people in the gang know they have a turn coming up, that is, they have guaranteed employment to a certain extent. He also said that the Plaintiff stopped working with Euro Caribe because of his food business which he started after expulsion.

14. In the result I held that on a balance the Plaintiff's expulsion from the Union had some effect on the employment he would have obtained between that date and 1978 when he stopped working on the waterfront. While the extent to which it did, was not clear from the evidence, it appeared that this effect was not substantial.

15. I now proceed to determine the amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled. On this, I am guided by Lord Denning M.R. who in Edwards v. S.O.G.A.T.[1971]Ch. 354 at pg. 377 "they are to be ascertain by putting the Plaintiff in as good a position so far as money can do it, as if he had never been excluded from the Union, taking into account, of course, all contingencies which might have led to him losing his employment anyway: and remembering, too, that it was his duty to do what was reasonable to mitigate the damage."

16. In view of my findings above, the loss of the Plaintiff was not as much as he indicated i.e. $1,000 - $1,200 per year nor was it clear what was the real loss, but I felt it was incumbent upon me to estimate his loss in this regard. I obtained some assistance from the evidence of the amounts he admitted he earned from one firm other than Belize Estate between the years 1972 to 1976. Giving the matter, the best judgment I can, I estimated the Plaintiff's loss over the three-year period to $1,000.

17. Judgment then for the Plaintiff. He will have:

(1) A declaration that this expulsion from the Christian Workers' Union is unlawful and null and void;

(2) An injunction restraining the Executive Committee of the said Union and each and every member thereof whether by itself or himself or by an officer, servant or agent of the said Committee or by any member of the said Union or in any other way whatsoever from enforcing the said expulsion or interfering with the Plaintiff in his use and benefits of membership of the said Union.

(3) Damages in the sum of $1,000.00 with interest thereon at 6% from date of judgment until payment.

(4) His costs to be agreed or taxed.

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