Supreme Court
Action No. 250 of 1981
31st August, 1983
Moe, C.J.

Messrs Glen Godfrey and Edwin Flowers, for the Plaintiff.
Messrs Denys Barrow and Dean Barrow, for the Defendant.

Libel - Defendant, the Editor of Amandala Newspaper sued for libel by Government Minister on the basis of an article in that newspaper alleging Minister was guilty of graft, bribery, fraud and corruption in office - Defendant pleading fair comment - How to ascertain whether statements are defamatory - Need to construe the words in their natural and ordinary meaning - What needs to be proved for defence of fair comment to succeed - Damages for libel - Plaintiff seeking aggravated or exemplary damages - Defendant refusing to offer an apology - Court finding Defendant to have been actuated by malice - Whether Defendant's actions merited punitive damages to be awarded against him - Evidence to mitigate damages - Defendant bringing witnesses to prove that Plaintiff was held by society to be a man of low morals - Plaintiff failing to bring witnesses to rebut Defendant's evidence - Effect on quantum of damages.

J U D G M E N T

This is an Action for damages for libel brought by the Plaintiff a Minister in the Government of Belize against the Defendant as Editor of the newspaper "The Amandala" in respect of an article in that newspaper dated July 3rd, 1981.

The words complained of read as follows: -

"IS THE PREMIER DISHONEST
-A PUP SPEAKS OUT-

I don't know of any PUP who would bother to defend the honesty and integrity of the Chairman of our party, Louie Sylvestre. The man is such an out and out thief and hustler that he has stooped so low as to arrange for $3.50 for every cement lamp post purchased in Chetumal to be credited to him. He has also found a way to bargain for big money with the country's postage stamps, in the process allowing a handful of Panamanians to reap a killing off a natural resource that should be in the hands of Belizeans only.

These are outside of his numerous corrupt activities. And you should see the mansion he is building in Miami. Mr. Sylvestre is now accepted as a millionaire. Thanks, no doubt, to George Cadle Price, Premier of Belize and Minister of Finance (finance means money).

Louie, of course, is not the only thief in Government who carries the title of Honourable in front of his name. They are all Honourable men, representathieves who have their greedy fingers deep in the country's pork barrel".

The Plaintiff in his Statement of Claim alleged that the words of the article in their natural and ordinary meaning meant and were understood to mean:

(a) That the Plaintiff is a dishonest person.

(b) That the Plaintiff in his capacity as a Minister of the Government of Belize has been involved in graft, bribery, fraud, embezzlement and/or corruption in the conduct of his office.

(c) That the Plaintiff has fraudulently misappropriated or received Government funds.

(d) That the Plaintiff has fraudulently misappropriated or received or arranged to misappropriate or receive $3.50 for each cement lamp post purchased in Chetumal.

(e) That the Plaintiff has fraudulently profiteered off the sale of Belizean stamps.

(f) That the Plaintiff has knowingly allowed Panamanians to fraudulently profiteer off the sale of Belizean stamps.

(g) That the Plaintiff is involved in numerous corrupt activities.

By the defence, the Defendant admitted the meanings in paragraphs (a) and (d) to (g) inclusive. He pleaded that in so far as the words consist of allegations of fact, they are true in substance and in fact; in so far as they consist of expressions of opinion, they are fair comment made in good faith and without malice upon the said facts, which are matters of public interest in that they relate to the conduct of the Plaintiff as the holder of a public office.

I think it convenient to determine at this point whether the natural and ordinary meaning of the article is that alleged in paragraphs (b) and (c). The article clearly refers to the Plaintiff in his capacity as a Minister of Government. The Defendant himself has said they refer to the conduct of the Plaintiff as a holder of a public office. The meaning of Graft as shown in Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary is "taking advantage of one's position to gain money etc. dishonestly" and the ordinary person understands this meaning particularly in the realm of politics. The mean of Bribery, is "the offering, giving or taking of rewards for corrupt practices"; That of Fraud is "deceit, trickery or cheating"; The meaning found in the dictionary for Embezzlement is the "fraudulent appropriation of public money" and for Corruption, the meaning is, "depravity, wickedness, perversion or deterioration of moral principles, loss of purity or integrity." Therefore looking at the article as a whole I cannot find that the words of the article mean or could be understood to mean that the Plaintiff was involved in bribery or embezzlement.

The words clearly mean that the Plaintiff arranged to receive money in respect of lamp post purchases. The Defendant has admitted that the words mean the Plaintiff fraudulently arranged to receive this money. A person who has behaved in this way, has indulged in fraud. Further gaining money dishonestly is not in keeping with moral principles and is thus an aspect of corruption. The Defendant has also admitted that the words mean that the Plaintiff is involved in corrupt activities. These meanings are about Louie Sylvestre, a person in government who carries the title of Honourable in front of his name; to the ordinary Belizean referring to Louie Sylvestre the Minister of Government. That person, the article says, is one of the Honourable men, representathieves who have their greedy fingers deep in the country's pork barrel. These words, to the ordinary person throughout the English speaking Caribbean and surely to the ordinary Belizean, mean graft. I hold that the article meant and was understood to mean as alleged in paragraph (b) to the following extent, that the Plaintiff in his capacity as a Minister of the Government of Belize has been involved in graft, fraud and/or corruption in the conduct of his office.

While there is a meaning as already indicated that the Plaintiff fraudulently arranged to receive money I do not find that the article says that the money was Government funds. The Plaintiff's claim for meaning as at paragraph (c) is not established.

I hold that the words of the Article do in fact have the meanings pleaded in paragraphs (a), (b) to the extent indicated and (d) to (g) inclusive. Each of those meanings is defamatory of the Plaintiff. Defendant's counsel conceded that the defence, i.e. the Defendant's plea of fair comment was not made out. The defence pleaded was evidently without substance. At this point I refer to certain aspects of the matter. To succeed in such a defence, the Defendant must show that the words are comments i.e. not statements of fact. He must also show the basis of fact for the comment appearing in the article under consideration. In this case, the words bearing the defamatory meanings are in my view all statements of fact and not comment. Indeed the Defendant in delivering particulars ordered said the following words are statements of fact:

(i) That the Plaintiff arranged for $3.50 cents for every cement lamp post purchased in Chetumal to be credited to him.

(ii) That the Plaintiff found a way to bargain for big money with the country's postage stamps, in the process allowing a handful of Panamanians to reap a killing off a natural resource that should be in the hands of Belizeans only.

(iii) That the Plaintiff engaged in numerous corrupt activities. I find in addition the following words are statements of fact and not comment "Louie, of course, is not the only thief in Government who carries the title of Honourable in front of his name. They are all Honourable men, representathieves who have their greedy fingers deep in the country's pork barrel." There was no attempt to show what part, if any, of the offending words was comment. But even if any part of the words is to be regarded as comment, it was not shown to be true of any fact stated in the article upon which the Defendant would have purported to comment.

Particulars of facts and matters given by the Defendant as those on which he would rely to support imputation (d) were to my mind most peculiar. They were to be of an arrangement by the Plaintiff with a person of a name unknown, arrangement taking place on a date which could not be precisely stated, arrangement being to add to a price agreed to between the Belize Electricity Board and a firm, name unknown. If those were the facts which were available to the Defendant, it was highly irresponsible to make the allegation concerned. As expected he did not seek to establish these matters.

With regard to the imputations (e) and (f) the particulars given on which the Defendant would rely were (1) of the Plaintiff signing a contract with a Panamanian business concern without the advice of the Stamp Advisory Committee. This was established. (2) That the contract was signed with the prior knowledge of the Stamp Advisory Committee. This was established. (3) That the contract was wholly a creation of the Panamanian concern. This was not established. (4) That it was signed without the advice of the Attorney General's Ministry. This was not established. (5) That the contract was so repugnant to the philatelic interests of Belize and the practices of the Panamanian business concern so injurious to the philatelic credibility of Belize that the international philatelic market and a leading philatelic journal denounced Belizean stamps and described Belize's philatelic practices as "money-grabbing". This was not established. Nothing before the Court supported the allegation that the Plaintiff fraudulently profiteered off the sale of Belizean stamps or that he allowed Panamanians to fraudulently profiteer off the sale of Belizean stamps.

Also of facts on which he would rely the Defendant gave particulars of matters relating to the Belize Electricity Board. He did not seek to establish these before the Court. Lastly he gave particulars of a matter occurring in August 1963 when the Plaintiff resigned as a Minister of Government for having done certain things. The fact of resignation and the reason thereof were established. But neither this nor anything established before the Court supported the allegation at (g). In the result, none of the statements of facts was substantiated and I will advert again to this aspect of the matter later in this judgment.

The Plaintiff is entitled to damages from the Defendant for the libel and the question now is the amount to be awarded. The Plaintiff claimed on the footing of aggravated or exemplary damages. The Plaintiff in addition to being a Minister of Government is the Chairman of the political party which presently governs the country. He is a member of the House of Representatives, the elected chamber, having been elected thereto at every election since 1961.

The article complained of is in my judgment highly defamatory containing as it does imputations of dishonesty and involvement in graft and corruption. These are very serious and damaging imputations to level against a Minister of Government. On this alone with no defence made out the Plaintiff would be entitled to substantial damages.

The Defendant refused to give an apology when it was first sought and up to the close of the case had given none. Rather than giving an apology the Defendant published the following derogatory statements of the Plaintiff:

(1) In the issue of "the Amandala" dated July 10, 1981, in an article headed "Louis Sylvestre threatens Libel Suit against Evan Hyde", reference is made to the demand of the Plaintiff's attorney-at-law for "financial redress to the Plaintiff for the humiliation and anguish he has suffered" and the article concluded with the following statement "How do you suffer humiliation and anguish when you have exploited your position for financial gain as much as Luigi has for the past twenty years?" - a veiled suggestion of involvement in graft (See meaning of graft above).

(2) In the issue of the Amandala dated August 7, 1981 under an article headed "Chub Boy serves Writ" there is a photograph of the Plaintiff under which appear the words "Check the eyes, Jim --- beady and greedy".

(3) In the issue of the Amandala dated August 25, 1981, on page 2, under a heading in bold print, "Sylvestre: How to get rich off taxpayers", there is a letter in which appear inter alia the following statements - "Now with the approval of the Premier, Mr. Sylvestre hires as manager of the B.E.B. (Be1ize Electricity Board) a very close friend of his, a Cuban American by the name of Mr. Brull. If Mr. Brull were only a close friend to the Minister it wouldn't be too bad but Mr. Brull has a big business in electrical enterprise in Miami, Florida U.S.A. Mr. Brull is not interested in the interests of the B.E.B. and the people of Belize, but in his own personal interest. So we can safely assume the line that Mr. Brull will buy everything for B.E.B. from his business enterprise in Miami and of course we can all expect "Cous" to make a commission."

In the conduct of his defence, the Defendant insisted that imputations (d), (e), (f) and (g) were statements of facts. This was by virtue of particulars delivered on 5th January 1982. But as already indicated in this judgment he has not substantiated those statements of fact.

From all the circumstances I inferred that the Defendant was actuated by malice. I also took this into account and hold it as a factor which aggravates the damages which ought to be awarded. I however do not find any evidence that the Defendant's libel of the Plaintiff is one which falls into any category meriting punitive damages.

With a sum fixed in my mind as to what ought to be proper compensation for the libel concerned I turn to see whether there has been any mitigation of damages, that is, whether the damages are to be reduced on account of any evidence before me. The Defendant gave notice of his intention to adduce evidence in mitigation of damages and presented various witnesses to the court. On this question I consider only the evidence such as it is, as to the general reputation of the Plaintiff as to that area of his character under consideration.

Mr. Stewart Krohn, a journalist, said that to his knowledge at the time of the libel i.e. July 1981, the Plaintiff's reputation in relation to his conduct of the affairs of government for which he is responsible is low in terms of (competence, interest and) integrity. He said that the opinion is based on gossip and social contact with members of the community, etc. He gave his evidence dispassionately and struck me as one whose evidence I can safely act upon. I accepted it but the weight I attached to it was governed by the fact that the reputation stated was based on gossip. Mr. Wilfred Elrington, an attorney-at-law, said that at the time of the libel the Plaintiff's reputation was bad in the areas of honesty as a Minister. He readily admitted he does not know the Plaintiff personally and that the reputation he stated is what he read of the Plaintiff and what he heard people speak of him. This admission also dictated the weight I put on his evidence as to the Plaintiff's reputation. Mrs. Norma Fuller's evidence was that the Plaintiff's reputation as a Minister of Government was that he was not concerned nor conscientious enough. This did not relate to the area of the Plaintiff's character under consideration. Mr. Leslie Nisbet gave some evidence as to the general reputation of the Plaintiff but I did not take it into account since it was such that it was unclear whether he was attesting to today's reputation whereas I am concerned with the reputation prior to or at the time of the libel. In addition I got the impression that he was antagonistic towards the Plaintiff. He admitted personal dislike of the Plaintiff, hedged when asked about differences between himself and the Plaintiff but finally admitted he blames the Plaintiff for the loss of his employment as General Manager of Air Florida. Even if his evidence was shown to be relevant I would have given little weight to it. Finally Sir Alexander Hunter, a former Minister in the Government of Belize said that at the time of the libel the Plaintiff's reputation was (as it is now) a very unenviable one. He formed the opinion from moving in social, business and political circles that the Plaintiff has no respect for honesty, (dignity) or integrity. His general reputation for honesty was very low and as a Minister of Government was deplorable. I also accepted the evidence of this witness.

I therefore have before me evidence that at the time of the libel the Plaintiff had a general reputation of being lacking in integrity and honesty both generally and as a Minister of Government. No rebuttal evidence was presented. I took note of the fact that at the close of the Defendant's case what the Plaintiff sought to rebut was a specific denial of one witness. There was no effort to rebut the evidence of general low reputation for dishonesty and lack of integrity. It seems to me that here the words of Cave J., appearing in his judgment in Scott v. Sampson (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 491 at 503, are most appropriate. He said "a Plaintiff who has notice that general evidence of bad character will be adduced against him, can have no difficulty whatever if he is a man of good character in coming prepared with friends who have known him to prove that his reputation has been good." In this case evidence of bad character was adduced but friends as to good reputation were not brought forward. I however remembered the evidence of Mr. Chavannes brought out during cross-examination of him, that he knows the Plaintiff well and considers him an honest man and a man of integrity. Further that the Plaintiff is held in high esteem and as a person of integrity in the society.

In my view of the evidence before me as to the Plaintiff's reputation, I asked myself to what extent have the damages which ought to be awarded for the libel concerned been reduced by such evidence? Defendant's counsel submitted that on the whole of the evidence, the Plaintiff would be entitled to only nominal or at any rate very small damages. That would mean that the effect of the evidence as to reputation is to wipe out the substantial damages which the Plaintiff might have otherwise obtained. The weight of the evidence left with me, whether unwittingly or not, is that the Plaintiff's reputation for honesty and integrity is low. But I cannot agree that that evidence wipes out the damages he ought to have for the libel on him.

In Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 24 at paragraph 209 it is stated "The fact that a Plaintiff is shown to have a bad reputation which cannot be made worse is no answer." This appears to be adapted from a sentence in a passage in the judgment of Scrutton L.J. in Hobbs v Tinling [1929] 2 K.B. 1 at page 17 where he said" --- a Defendant may reduce the damages for libel by proving that the Plaintiff had already a bad reputation. To do this the jury must take the view that his reputation is so bad that the defamatory statement complained of would reasonably and ordinarily cause much less damage than would be caused to a man of good reputation by the same statement. They may conceivably take the view that his reputation was so bad before the defamatory statement was published that no further defamatory allegation could make it worse. But they would have to consider before taking such a view, the undoubted fact that the worse a man's character is the more ready are people to believe such reports about him and to face the question whether it is lawful or desirable that because a man's character is bad anyone should be at liberty to make any defamatory statements they liked about him, regardless of their untruth." I am not aware of, and counsel was unable to refer me to, any reported case where it was held that in the case of any prima facie defamatory statement, proof that the Plaintiff had a bad reputation which could not be made worse was an answer to the action. It is, I think, generally assumed that the Plaintiff proving a statement prima facie defamatory and unexcused by justification, priviledge or fair comment is always entitled to nominal damages.

I considered that if a newspaper libels a man by publishing that he broke and entered Brodie's warehouse and stole $20,000 worth of goods, evidence given in mitigation of damages that the man at the time of the publication had a general reputation of dishonesty does not wipe out the damages he would otherwise be entitled to for the specific libel concerned. I take it that the evidence of his bad character may reduce the amount to be awarded but not necessarily to the extent that they be only nominal. I do not think it necessary to lengthen this judgment with other examples which may be given.

I am fortified in my approach by the words of their Lordships in the said Hobbs v Tinling (supra). This was a case in which the libel complained of contained numerous allegations of criminal or dishonest or disreputable conduct. The real line of defence as described by Scrutton L.J. was "It is true we have made a number of defamatory statements about you, none of which we can prove and which must be taken to be untrue, but we are going to prove that your character is so bad that our defamatory lies can cause you no damage and you have no remedy against us "(the Defendants' had paid in 20 S. into Court as sufficient damages). He went on to say "It is in my opinion much to be regretted if this view is to be readily acceded to, and if persons, whether newspaper proprietors or private persons ---- can recklessly publish untrue and defamatory statement about persons, and then shelter themselves under the plea: Your character is so bad that we may make any untrue statement we like about you with impunity. In any opinion any jury to whom such a plea is addressed should receive the most careful direction from the judge pointing out to them the effect of the course they are asked to adopt." I of course considered very carefully the effect of the course counsel has asked me to adopt. Then on the matter of damages Greer L.J. had this to say "I think also they (the jury) ought to have been told ---- that a man does not lose his right to damages because his character is not free from reproach, that a man with a damaged character is entitled to have his damaged character protected and if newspapers for their own purposes falsely allege that he has been guilty of (crimes and) misconduct the jury might well consider that even a man of bad character ought not to have his character made out to be blacker than the proved facts warrant."

A good reminder of what has to be borne in mind is set out by Devlin L.J. in Dingle v Associated Newspapers [196l] 2 W.L.R. 525 at page 549. He said "There are other elements besides permanent injury to character to be taken into account in the assessment of damages for defamation. There is mental distress, the pain caused by those who doubt, even if they hold final judgment in suspense and may be financial loss those also if they hold business in suspense as well. There is the malice of the Defendant if it is proved; the presence or absence of an apology and his conduct and that of his counsel before and during the trial."

Having therefore taken into account, the position and standing of the Plaintiff; the highly defamatory nature of the libel with six separate imputations, three as at (d), (e) and (f) being specific; the absence of a defence to the libel; the proved malice of the Defendant; the absence of an apology; that "the Amandala" has a very large circulation; the evidence of the Plaintiff's reputation and the suffering the Plaintiff must have had to endure, I have determined that the Plaintiff should be awarded damages in the sum of $6,500. He is also to have his costs certified for two counsel. Judgment accordingly.

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