Supreme Court
Action No. 309 of 2001
31st July, 2001.
Awich, J.

Ms. A. Moore for the Applicants
Ms. W.H. Courtenay SC for the Respondents

Interlocutory injunction - Serious question for determination based on sections 4 and 5 of the Trade Unions and Employers' Organizations (Registration, Recognition and Status) Act, Chapter 304 - Complex question of law proper for consideration at final determination.

J U D G M E N T

Background

Jose Luis Reyes, Oscar Orlando Maradiaga, Julio Carceres Hernandez, Cornelio Rubio Gutierrez, Emelina Bautista Rivera and Rigoberto Maldonado have applied to this Court for interlocutory injunction order to restrain the joint Defendants, John Zabaneh and Mayan King Ltd, from evicting the Applicants from houses they occupy on the Respondents' land. The Respondents are plantation owners who employ a large number of workers. The Applicants were employed by the Respondents until the Applicants individually received letters of dismissal in mid June 2001. Subsequently, the Applicants received letters informing them that they were to vacate the land of the Respondents by 15.6.2001. The Applicants said that meant they were to leave the houses they regarded as their homes on the plantation when they were employed by the Defendants.

The Applicants contended that their dismissal was unlawful under SS: 4 and 5 of the Trade Unions and Employers' Organizations, (Registration Recognition and Status) Act, Cap. 304 of the Statute Laws of Belize, and that their eviction from the plantation was also unlawful. On 18.6.2001 they issued a joint Writ of Summons, claiming a court declaration that their dismissal was wrongful and they asked for: "relief" which they did not specify, injunction prohibiting the Respondents from evicting them from the Respondents' land and costs. On the same day, the Applicants filed this application for injunction order. The application, apparently an ex parte one, was listed for hearing the next day, 19.6.2001. Having perused the application, I directed that it would have to be made as an inter partes application; there was no deposition to the effect that the Applicants were about to be forcibly evicted from their houses in a matter of hours or even a couple of days. I directed that the Respondents were to be served with the application and if there was some urgency, the service could be in less than the usual two clear days from the date of hearing.

The application came for hearing on 19.6.2001. It was adjourned to 21.6.2001. The Respondents, quite properly, consented to interim injunction orders while their attorneys studied the case papers. Interim injunction was, by consent, ordered and was to last until 23.7.2001. The application was heard on the adjourned date, 23.7.2001. The Respondents vehemently opposed the application.

The Submissions

Learned Counsel Ms. A. Moore, for the Applicants, submitted that the Applicants were on the Respondents' land as part of the benefit of the contracts of employment between them and the employers, the Respondents. Ms. Moore contended that the reason for the dismissal of the Applicants was that they had joined the Christian Workers Union, so their dismissal was unlawful under SS: 4 and 5 of the Trade Unions and Employers Organizations (Registration, Recognition and Status) Act. She argued that the right of the Applicants to occupy the houses on the plantation was part of the benefit in the contracts of employment of the Applicants with the Respondents and as the dismissal was wrongful, the Applicants were entitled to relief which would include reinstatement in their employment and the restoration of their right to remain in their houses on the Respondents' land. By that submission, Ms. Moore asked the Court to find that the dismissal of the Applicants was a serious question for trial and therefore the right of the Applicants to remain in their houses on the land, which is part of the question of dismissal, is also a serious question for trial which supports the application for interlocutory injunction order.

Learned Senior Counsel Mr. W.H. Courtenay, for the Respondents, on the other hand, contended that the Respondents terminated the employment of the Applicants so as to cut down business costs and run the Respondents' business profitably; the Respondents did not dismiss the Applicants because they had joined a trade union, the Respondents were not in breach of the Trade Unions and Employers Organizations (Registration, Recognition and Status) Act. Mr. Courtenay opposed the application for interlocutory injunction order purely on a principle of land law, submitting that the Applicants were on the land as licencees, their licences were revoked and they have no claim of any right to remain on the land. He submitted further, that even if the termination of the licences was in breach of the terms of the Applicants' licences, the Applicants, as licencees, would have right only in damages, not in remaining in occupation of the Respondents' land, and that the Applicants' claim in damages would not entitle them to remain on the land or to final injunction and therefore they would not apply for interlocutory injunction order. Mr. Courtenay asked that the application for interlocutory injunction order be dismissed.

Determination

The basis for considering the exercise of discretion to grant interlocutory injunction order is that the evidence in the Affidavits filed for the Applicant must establish a serious question about the right claimed, proper to go to trial. Numerous judgments in cases in this jurisdiction, including those in, Edward v Walter and Zuniga 3BLR 514 and Lionel Heredia v Beatrice Gallego, Supreme Court Action No. 300 of 2001 restate that fundamental basis. The contentions in this case, like in many other cases, are not about the rule to establish a serious question for trial, but about whether the facts disclose a serious question, the Applicants' substantive case is not merely frivolous.

The clear and to the point submission of Mr. Courtenay, about the lack of right of a licencee, based on the principle of land law cannot be faulted. Several judgments including that in Thompson v Park [1944] 2 All ER 477, which Mr. Courtenay cited support his submission. If the claim of the Applicants are based on the right of a licencee, which clearly does not lend them any cause of action, then I should refuse their application for interlocutory injunction order.

I accept that on the facts so far, the question of wrongful dismissal is a serious one. There is some merit in the claim because the dismissal came so soon after the Applicants had joined or participated in the meeting of the Christian Workers Union. I must, however, stress immediately that evidence at the trial and final determination may prove that notwithstanding, the termination of the employment of the Applicants was effected purely so as to cut down costs in the business of the Respondents, and that would not be wrongful under SS: 4 and 5 of the Trade Unions and Employers Organizations (Registration, Recognition and Status) Act.

Although I accepted the rule in land law outlined by Mr. Courtenay, I still entertained doubt as to whether the Applicants would not be entitled under the Trade Unions and Employers' Organization (Registration, Recognition and Status) Act, to reinstatement to their employment and therefore to all the benefits including remaining in the houses on the employer's land, were the Applicants to be successful in their claim based on unlawful dismissal. The answer to that point of law is not at this point so clear so that I should dismiss the application. The question, in my view, is complex and calls for more detailed submission and in-depth consideration, proper at the trial and final determination of the substantive case. The facts in this application are distinguishable from those in the Supreme Court Civil Action No. 300 of 2001, Lionel Heredia v Beatrice Gallego in which s. 14 of the Land Utilization Act, Cap. 158A, clearly denied any right based on sale of undivided portion of land so that no claim could be based on a contract in which the subject matter was a portion of undivided land. It was decided in that case that a claim based on such a contract disclosed no cause of action and therefore an application for interlocutory injunction order in the case was not supported by a serious question in the substantive case, the application was refused.

I have decided that there is a serious question for trial in the Applicants' substantive case, what about the balance of convenience, the comparative losses and disadvantages that the parties may each suffer in the event interlocutory injunction order is granted? In the case of the Respondents, were they to successfully defend the substantive case, or not granted in the case of the Applicants, were they to succeed in their claim in the substantive case?

The Affidavits of the Applicants state that they now have no alternative homes to go to and that leaving their present residences will cause disruption in the education of their children. Their first stated loss could be compensated for by an award of damages, the second stated is difficult to compensate with an award of damages, were the Applicants to succeed in their claim in the end. On the other hand, the losses to the Defendants are not obvious, were they to succeed in the end in defending the case against them. That is not surprising because Mr. Courtenay proceeds solely on the rule in land law, which I agree would not accord the Applicants, if they were licencees, any right and so they would be unable to show any serious question to go to trial. I note, however, that if the Applicants were at the final determination, to be found to have remained on the Respondents' land unlawfully after the notice given to them to vacate, that would be trespass which is actionable per se; the Respondents would be entitled to an award of general damages, without proof of specific losses to them and if need be, by eviction order or injunction.

In my view the circumstances of the substantive case and the point of law to be resolved call for the exercise of discretion in favour of preserving the status quo. I grant the application of the Applicants for interlocutory injunction order and limit it to restraining the Respondents, John Zabaneh and Mayan King Limited, from evicting the Applicants, Jose Luis Reyes, Oscar Orlando Maradiaga, Julio Carceres Hernandez, Cornelio Rubio Gutierrez, Emelina Bautista Rivera and Rigoberto Maldonado from their residences. The interlocutory injunction order is to last until final determination of the substantive case or until further order.

As security for damages, the Applicants are not to collect any pensions or social security benefits that may accrue or have already accrued to them, until the final determination of the substantive case or until further order.

Costs

Costs of the application are awarded to the Applicants.

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