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(TOLEDO
COMPANY LIMITED
(AND
(HAROLD WHITNEY |
PLAINTIFFS |
BETWEEN
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(
(AND
( |
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(FRANK
DERKITS |
DEFENDANT |
Supreme
Court
Action No. 369 of 1981
25th April, 1983
Alcantara, J.
Mr. Glenn
Godfrey, for the Plaintiffs.
Mr. Oscar Sabido, for the Defendant.
Defendant
and second Plaintiff entering into verbal agreement to for
a company limited by shares (first Plaintiff) for the purpose
of operating a lumber sawmill - Defendant undertaking to
provide sawmill and land on which sawmill was to be located
- Second Plaintiff undertaking to contribute $120,000 towards
the joint enterprise - Second Plaintiff only contributing
$20,000 and purchasing spare parts for the sawmill - No
written contract ever concluded between the Parties - Contract
- Action for return of machinery, tools and equipment or
their value and for damages for detaining the same - Detention
of property - Special damages - Quantum of damages.
J
U D G M E N T
In this
Action, the Plaintiffs seek the return of certain machinery,
tools and equipment or their value, and damages for detaining
the same. The list of the goods claimed is set out in the
Statement of Claim and includes a generator.
There
is no dispute that the second Plaintiffs and the Defendant
entered into negotiations for a joint enterprise in the lumber
business. The second Plaintiff was going to contribute money
and the Defendant was going to provide a sawmill and land.
A limited company was going to be formed, the Toledo Lumber
Company Limited, the first Plaintiff; the second Plaintiff
would own 60% of the shares in the company and the Defendant
40% of the shares. The second Plaintiff would contribute $120,000
to buy the sawmill from the Defendant, and the Defendant would
sell the sawmill to the company, and his wife would execute
a lease of the land where the sawmill stood for the benefit
of the company.
According
to both parties, the second Plaintiff and Defendant, though
contrary to their pleadings, the contract was never finalized.
The second Plaintiff says that there was never any contract.
The Defendant in turn says that whatever agreement there was,
it was subject to contract.
Notwithstanding
this, a number of things happened. The Defendant allowed the
sawmill to be used for the benefit of both parties. The second
Plaintiff contributed $20,000 to their joint enterprise. As
pleaded, the limited company was incorporated on the 15th
July, 1980. There is no evidence as to whether any shares
were fully paid up. Also, the second Plaintiff procured and
installed a number of equipment and machinery in the sawmill
to enhance production.
What never
happened was the transfer of the sawmill or the execution
of the lease on one side, or the further contribution of $100,000
on the other side. Each blames the other for the break down
in the negotiations. I have seen them both in the witness-box
and my impression is that they are equally to blame. My assessment
is that neither side trusted the other.
The joint
enterprise came to an end without the contract having come
into existence or finalized. The Plaintiff does not claim
the return of the $20,000 but does claim the return of the
machinery and equipment.
Although
the Defendant admits having received the said equipment and
machinery, he alleges that there was an agreement whereby
the second Plaintiff would replace parts and equipment needed
for the sawmill operation. The evidence adduced does not lead
me to this conclusion. Rather it was on the second Plaintiff's
initiative that such parts were replaced, and according to
the Defendant, he did not make any request or demand. He just
allowed it to happen.
I find
as a fact that the parts and equipment supplied and installed
at the sawmill did for a time benefit both parties. As they
were permanently installed, they cannot be easily removed,
more so when the replaced parts have now disappeared. I find
as a fact that the sawmill has been enhanced by these new
parts and the generator. The Defendant cannot be allowed to
benefit from them without in some way compensating the Plaintiffs.
At the very least, the Plaintiffs are entitled on a quantum
meruit. However, I find that the Plaintiff succeeds on
the ground of detention of property.
Counsel
for the Defendant has referred me to the Law of Bailment and
has drawn my attention to Clerk and Lindsell on Tort
p.973 arguing that the machinery and equipment which was incorporated
in the mill was a bailment. This is not only contrary to the
pleadings but not in accord with the evidence. I find it unnecessary
to deal with the legal principles of Bailor and Bailee as
there was no bailment.
The Plaintiffs say that the second Plaintiff paid $4,000 by
way of deposit for the generator, which the Defendant surprisingly
says is worth $12,000. I think that the Plaintiffs are entitled
to $4,000 for that item. I refer to paragraph l2A Defence
which reads as follows:
"The
Defendant denies wrongfully depriving the Plaintiffs of
one 60 KW Generator with GM 671 Power Unit with control
boxes, and avers that said Generator is the property of
William Gillett who is the sole owner of same and has not
transferred his ownership to the Plaintiffs."
Mr. William
Gillett has come to give evidence. I say without hesitation
that I do not believe him on the question of the generator.
There is no doubt that he made an arrangement with Mr. Whitney
and not with Mr. Derkits. In this Action he has no right or
standing to claim the generator back, particularly when he
still retains the $4,000 paid by the Plaintiff Whitney as
a deposit. As regards the other items claimed, the evidence
is somewhat nebulous. The Plaintiff in examination in chief
did not give any value. In cross-examination he said he paid
$10,000. The Defendant in his evidence did say $3,000 as being
their present value. On this point I prefer the evidence of
the Defendant.
I give
judgment for the Plaintiff in the sum of $7,000 and costs.
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