Supreme Court
Action No. 67 of 1977
October, 1982
Staine, C.J.

Mr. S. W. Musa, for the Plaintiffs.
Mr. P. S. W. Goldson, for the Defendants.

Title to land - Plaintiffs applying to Court seeking possession of land, a declaration that the First and Second Defendants were not entitled to the land, an injunction restraining the First and Second Defendants from remaining or occupying the land either themselves or through their servants - Plaintiffs having first certificate of Title to the Land - Effect of first certificate of Title - Limitation Ordinance - Defendants alleging that they had title to land by virtue of long adverse possession for a period of 12 years - Whether possession was for a continuous and uninterrupted period - Effect where possession is for broken periods.

J U D G M E N T

This Action was brought by the Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, seeking possession of a parcel of land comprising some 97 acres, a declaration that the first and second named Defendants are not entitled to the property mentioned, and an injunction restraining the first and second named Defendants, their servants or agents from remaining on or continuing in occupation of the property. The Plaintiffs also asks the Court to award damages, such other relief as the Court might grant and costs. By the Statement of Claim filed in this Action, the Plaintiffs allege they were at all material times the owners and entitled to the possession of that parcel of land comprising 97 acres situate on the sea coast on the north side of the mouth of the South Stann Creek River. This the first named Plaintiff bought from Russell Grant by a conveyance recorded at the General Registry. Further, the first named Plaintiff applied for and obtained a First Certificate of Title and registered it in the Land Titles Register. Subsequently, by a Transfer Certificate of Title, the property was transferred into the joint names of the first and second named Plaintiffs.

Previous to the issue of the Transfer Certificate of Title, the first named Plaintiff had taken possession of the property, erected "no trespassing signs" and employed the third named Defendant as resident caretaker thereof. The Plaintiffs alleged that the first and second named Defendants wrongfully entered the land, thus trespassing and despite repeated requests to quit, have refused to deliver up possession.

The Defendants denied the allegation of the Plaintiffs, and countered that the Defendants had bought the said property from one Marie Young in 1962, and developed it as a part of a larger holding. Further, they had employed one Harold Humes as Manager of the entire estate, and that the Plaintiffs were fully aware that the Defendants were in occupation of the said property.

Additionally, the Defendants contended that whatever cause of action the Plaintiffs had was now barred by section 12 of the Limitation Ordinance on which they would rely for its full force and effect as a bar to the Action to evict them.

At the hearing of the case, the first named Plaintiff gave evidence in the course of which, he said that he was a real estate agent and in the course of his work he came across a parcel of land of 97 acres, in the South Stann Creek River and he became interested in the land. It appears, he discovered who was the owner so he wrote to Mr. Russell Grant in 1969, offering to buy the property. In 1970, he purchased the piece of land from Mr. Grant and obtained a conveyance therefor. Thereafter, he applied to the General Registry for a First Certificate of Title and was able to prove authenticity, and so obtained it. In 1974, he transferred title to his wife and himself, and this was registered in the Land Titles Register.

The first Plaintiff continued that in September, 1970, he visited the property and found one Margarito Ramos in residence there. The Plaintiff notified Ramos that he had bought the property and Ramos told him he had been collecting coconuts and giving them to Harold Humes at Blair Atholl. The Plaintiff had in fact met Harold Humes some years before and knew that Humes was Mr. Grant's caretaker for his property in that area.

The Plaintiff informed Ramos that since he was now owner of the 97 acres of land he would make the same arrangements with him as regards collecting and sharing the coconuts. Ramos agreed and it was arranged that Thomas Ramirez could bring the coconuts to Belize City. This arrangement worked and continued until sometime in 1972.

The Plaintiff had promised to send some "No Trespassing" signs which were to be erected on the land by Ramos. He did send the signs and promised that he would notify Harold Humes that Ramos would be collecting coconuts for the Plaintiff and not any longer for Mr. Grant, as the Plaintiff had become the owner of the land and Ramos was in occupation on behalf of the Plaintiff and not any longer for Mr. Grant.

The Plaintiff sent down the signs and saw them after they were erected. Subsequently, the Plaintiff saw Harold Humes and because of what Humes told him, the Plaintiff contacted the first and second Defendants. Apparently, they were contending they had bought the 97 acre piece of land from Marie Young. The Plaintiff also learnt from Ramos, that the first and second Defendants along with Harold Humes had visited the property and had told Ramos the property belonged to them, not to the Plaintiff, and had given Ramos notice to move. Ramos had asked for some time as he had sow expecting to give birth, and he was, therefore, allowed to stay. All this, Ramos reported to the Plaintiff and resumed sending coconuts to him.

Harold Humes subsequently sent one Nicho Simmonds with a threat that if any more coconuts were delivered to anyone but Humes, action would be taken against such person. As a result of this, the Plaintiff caused a letter to be written to Humes by the Plaintiff's Solicitor. The Plaintiff told of other efforts to settle this dispute annually, but without result.

At the hearing of this Action, the Plaintiff in giving evidence produced a map of the area showing the location of the piece of land in dispute, as well as other lands bought by the Defendants. The parcel of land claimed by the Plaintiff is shown in solid red and labelled 97 A, whereas the lands bought by the Defendants is shown in green and lie about a mile south of Riversdale. These parcels were not adjacent to the land in dispute, so would not be mistaken for it. They are clear, distinct and separate.

The point of greatest importance to note in the evidence of the first Plaintiff, is that he presented a certified copy of the First Certificate of Title to the parcel of land claimed and it is virtually impossible to provide evidence which would nullify or supersede that. In other words, it would take more than a side wind to overcome or supersede the quality of a title to land set up by a First Certificate of Title. In giving evidence, the first Plaintiff also alluded to lands which Marie Young had bought from Louis Grant and showed that to be clearly demarcated from 75 acres and in a different location.

Harold Humes gave evidence for the Defendants. He said he was caretaker of Riversdale Estate, which had originally belonged to Louis Grant the father of Russell Grant, and had worked with him since 1927, living at Blair Atholl.

As caretaker, his duties were to look after all the lands that belonged to Mr. Grant in that area and to collect coconuts from the various sites. This witness did not refer to a map or plan, but was able to say that Riversdale Estate consisted of the South Stann Creek River and the 96 acres of land which the first Plaintiff had bought. He further said that Russell Grant sold all the land he owned of which Riversdale consisted including the 96 acres of land, which the first Plaintiff said he bought from Russell Grant and for which he was able to produce a First Certificate of Title. The witness was not able to explain this anomaly, because if MarieYoung had bought lands from Russell Grant including the 96 acres, how is it that the Plaintiffs had a First Certificate of Title for the same 96 acres of land? The witness was not able to answer this. Further he had never resided on the 96 acres or any portion of it, and had in fact resided in Belize City and not Blair Atholl, from 1957 - 1964. So he was not able to speak affirmatively concerning that period. Moreover, the person in occupation of the 96 acres from September, 1970 to March, 1971, was Margarito Ramos, the third named Defendant, and during this period he was in occupation on behalf of the first named Plaintiff, because it was to him that Ramos used to deliver coconuts even after being warned by the first named Defendant that he the Defendant was the owner of that plot of land.

So as far as this witness was concerned, his testimony was not particularly helpful since he was absent from Blair Atholl from 1957 to 1964 and is not able to speak as to that period. More particularly, he is not able to say who was in occupation of the 96 acres, during that period. The last witness for the Defendants was Marie Young. She testified that she recalled entering into an agreement with Russell Grant on the 31st March, 1956, to purchase lands from him. The lands were to be paid for over a period of five years. She produced to the Court a certified copy of the agreement to purchase and this described that she purchased separate parcels of land which were variously located, but none of which included a 96 acre plot. Moreover, the location and boundaries of each plot of land was given and none of the five plots gave the boundaries of the 96 acres as it was given in the copy of the conveyance produced by the Plaintiff. So, it would appear that Marie Young had not bought the 96 acres plot. In fact, she admitted as much when she said she had not read the document.

So, Harold Humes was wrong when he pointed out 96 acres as being part of the land which Marie Young had bought in the transaction of 31st March, 1962; if he was wrong in this, how reliable a witness was he? I am inclined to think that Harold Humes was the author of this whole lawsuit. Having failed to establish a right to the property by purchase, Counsel for the Defendants applied to amend the pleadings to include a claim that the Plaintiff had lost his right to bring an action to recover the 96 acres of land by virtue of long continued occupation adverse to the owner. This was granted.

Counsel argued that even if Marie Young did not acquire the 96 acres by purchase, the Plaintiff had lost his right to bring an action to recover by virtue of long continued adverse possession under the Limitation Ordinance. The period of adverse possession was 12 years and when Russell Grant sold in 1970 this period was already passed and it was too late to bring an action now as the Limitation Ordinance barred that.

It is note worthy that no attempt was made to argue around the holding of a First Certificate of Title. Instead, reliance is placed on the Limitation Ordinance which is not a sword, but a shield. The first question to ask therefore is, has there been a continuous and uninterrupted period of occupation amounting to at least 12 years.

According to the evidence, Harold Humes left Blair Atholl in 1957 and did not return to it until 1964, a period of seven years. So he is not able to speak of events during that period, but it is clear that he never resided on the 96 acres plot so possession cannot be traced through him. The man who was living on the land in dispute was Margarito Ramos, the third named Defendant, and through whom possession appears to be claimed, even he was not living on the land at a certain period, for according to Marie Young, no one was living on the land from 1961 - 1964. So the argument that Marie Young claims by obtaining title by long undisputed possession must fail. For this doctrine to succeed, the possession must be unbroken for a period of at least 12 years and in this case possession was broken at least on one occasion from 1961 to 1964 when Harold Humes returned to Blair Atholl and also it appeared Margarito Ramos. The Defendant having failed to prove possession by virtue of a legal title conferred by purchase and having failed to set up a defence by virtue of the Limitation Ordinance, judgment must be given to the Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs are declared to be the rightful owners of that piece of land comprising 97 acres or thereabouts named in the Writ. Further, the Defendants, their servants or agents or representatives are perpetually enjoined from remaining on, entering, or occupying the said lands or any portion thereof. In addition, the Plaintiffs are awarded the sum of $2,000.00 representing nominal damages, in the absence of any evidence of special damages. And, I order the costs of this Action to be borne by the Defendants.

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